




THE EVOLUTION OF NON-MILITARY NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL 















A thesis submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements 























© 2020 John Duda 




This paper is about the evolution of nuclear and radiological preparedness primarily 
in the U.S. over the last 50 years.  In the first chapter, the reader is provided the 
understanding that non-military nuclear and radiological preparedness from a public 
standpoint during the 1970s through the end of the century was reactive in nature 
due to the infancy of the new field with nuclear and radioactive uses first starting in 
the 40s, the creation of new agencies and real world events providing lessons 
learned and best practices.  The second chapter focuses on radiological security 
and its life cycle in the U.S. starting in the early 2000s to a point of maturity today.  
The final chapter provides the reader context on how one might determine if 
government preparedness is effective with the use of tabletop exercises.  Primary 
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When I started this paper and submitted one chapter over eight years ago to 
my professor at Johns Hopkins, I never fully grasped the idea that I might actually be 
able to bring legitimate and robust insight into the topic in which I would be writing 
about. At the time, I was working as a contractor to the National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA) with just around three years of experience conducting 
exercises and working with foreign as well as U.S. Federal, state and local 
government agencies on nuclear and radiological preparedness. I submitted my 
chapter on tabletop exercise effectiveness and felt as if it was a true contribution to 
the preparedness exercise community for the time. Over the next eight years, I 
continued small bits of coursework to reach present day. In 2019 and 2020, close to 
eight years later, I have completed my work on this paper and bring a significantly 
different perspective to the first two chapters. Having started and led a company 
during this same period that provides consulting in Weapons of Mass Destruction 
and nuclear and radiological preparedness, I both admire some of the aspects of 
forward thinking that was presented at the time in 2012, but also reflect on the 
naiveite of the student with little experience that I was. For this reason, I have left 
chapter 3 predominately untouched other than some minor expansion of thought. As 
I work in this field today, I plan to continue my research on chapter 3 at a later date 
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In this paper, I will look at the evolution of nonmilitary nuclear and radiological 
preparedness in the U.S. government during periods of transition. This paper will 
attempt to illustrate the progress the U.S. has made from 1970 through today in the 
infrastructure, policy, and actual response related to nuclear and radiological 
preparedness. Throughout the paper, I will use a variety of metrics, charts and 
interviews to give the reader a better perspective on how preparedness evolved.  
Chapter One, Was the 30-year period prior to the end of the 20th century 
(1970-2000) evidence that the world’s governments were not ready or prepared to 
effectively respond to nuclear and radiological incidents?, starts by taking the reader 
through a brief history of the transition of nuclear and radiological preparedness from 
a military responsibility, and then transitioning to the public sector’s role. The 
peaceful use of nuclear power and radiological patient and industrial uses 
commenced in 1942 with the first self-sustaining nuclear reaction1. At this time, the 
world and specifically the U.S. were very inexperienced at preparing for incidents 
involving nuclear and radioactive material as it was a new threat. I present the 1970s 
as the decade of catalyst change in nuclear and radiological preparedness that will 
be seen in the subsequent years to follow. 
Historical events provide context to the evolution of the U.S. preparedness 
community and policy. Throughout the chapter, I look to illustrate the point that our 
government was reactive in nature to nuclear and radiological incidents and were 
driven to change infrastructure, policy, and response by real-world incidents. A 
 
1 Department of Energy.  History of Nuclear Energy. Accessed 04/19/20. 
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timeline is provided at the close of the chapter to show this over the course of 30 
years. I submit that the turning point of the U.S.’s reactive shift to a proactive 
government was made in the mid-90s with steps being taken by the federal 
government in law and guidance.   
Chapter 2, How has radiological security evolved since the turn of the 
century?,  shifts the focus from both nuclear and radiological preparedness to just 
radiological security. This is intentional for a couple of reasons. In the late 90s and 
early 2000s, terrorism and the use of WMDs became of great concern worldwide. By 
its nature, the nuclear threat will always pose a greater consequence if one were to 
compare an attentional attack versus a radiological attack. What was overlooked up 
until the start of the 2000s (at least in all available information to the public) was the 
radiological threat from a security incident. Although the physical consequence 
impact from a detonation of a radiological device vs. nuclear device would be 
exponentially less, the probability and availability of radioactive material to terrorists 
was and still is significantly greater.   
This chapter aims to illustrate how security, response, policy, and 
infrastructure around radioactive material evolved from 2000 through today the 
events of 9/11 until present day. In addition, this chapter will also address real-world 
threats provided the U.S. government the information to understand that the threat 
from radioactive material being used to harm a population is possible and technically 
feasible. The goal of this chapter is also to illustrate radiological security in the U.S. 
during the last 20 years as a life cycle. If the early 2000s was the introduction of the 
problem and solution, the mid 2000s were the growth stage and the last five years 
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have been the maturity stage for the U.S. government. At the end of this chapter, the 
reflection on 20 years being a short time in comparison to preparedness to other 
threats is made…as it is acknowledged that we are still in an infancy phase with 
regards to this field as a whole, not to mention preparedness for it.  
Lastly, Chapter 3, Tabletop exercises: Are they effective? transitions the topic 
from radiological security and preparedness to what is an effective method of testing 
preparedness. Because the U.S. has shifted its approach to an all-hazard mindset, it 
is often looked at to prepare organizations for a multitude of disasters using specific 
scenarios to test that genre of a disaster. This chapter will not just look through the 
nuclear and radiological preparedness lens, but the entire all-hazard lens to get a 
better picture as if using tabletop exercises are effective to test preparedness in 
planning. The chapter will identify the various exercise methods and how they are 
used and will conclude with suggestions on how using quantitative metrics can 
better help determine effectiveness to discussion-based exercises. Although this 
chapter was written, accepted for submission, and graded eight years ago, its 
innovative rubric proposal, which was designed to assist agencies, organizations, 
and planners to get the most benefit out of tabletops exercises, is even more 
relevant today if methods to gauge exercise success or failure are not being 
implemented.   
At the conclusion of the chapter, I propose using this rubric to help planners 
drive and measure the goals of each exercise. This rubric can be used today and 
moving forward. In the last three to five years, organizations and exercise planners 
have started to use and incorporate some of the methods of quantitative 
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measurement with success. I believe this is an outcome of my company’s and its 
peers’ efforts that have identified this need and this gap. This view has been 
reinforced by the U.S. Congress demanding more confidence in programs delivering 
results.   
From an overarching assessment, this paper should provide a holistic view of 
nonmilitary, nuclear and radiological preparedness over the last 50 years. It will also 
show the importance of our country remaining vigilant and proactive when it comes 
to potential threats. During the completion of this paper, the U.S. and the world were 
in the middle of the Coronavirus pandemic, further illustrating a fresh look at how 
governments react, respond and reflect. Much will be learned and changed by the 
U.S. going forward following a devolution to somewhat of a steady state with regards 
to operations and preparedness following the pandemic. This could prove to be a 
very relative comparison that can be made to this paper as we continue to evolve 
our preparedness and response to all-hazards similar to what we have done over 
the last 50 years with nuclear and radiological preparedness. Furthermore, the use 
of tools, plans, training, and exercises that are effective will be critical to the 





Was the 30-year period prior to the end of the 20th century (1970-2000) 
evidence that the world’s governments were not ready or prepared to 
effectively respond to nuclear and radiological incidents? 
 
Since the 1970s (and for more than a century before that), governments and 
private organizations have been preparing for general disasters through various 
forms of training, drills, and exercises. Nuclear and radiological incidents were a 
relatively new addition of disasters that had to be taken into consideration with their 
widespread use in commercial, public, and military sectors. This chapter starts with 
the 1970s since the military handled nuclear and radiological preparedness for much 
of century. A paradigm shift occurs to the public sector in the 1970s. Over the next 
30 years (1970-2000), a number of significant events took place that did not involve 
nuclear weapons and demonstrated that the U.S. government’s interagency 
response during this time was reactive in nature. This reactive approach highlights 
that actual events provided the greatest impetus for developing policies that dictated 
roles and responsibilities during a nuclear or radiological crisis.  
Moreover, the U.S. and other countries faced a multitude of nuclear and 
radiological incidents prior to the turn of the century that varied in scale and 
magnitude. While the first public use of nuclear or radiological material was used for 
military applications, peaceful uses for this technology began to proliferate; nuclear 
power plants were able to provide nations with an additional option to meet their 
energy needs, the medical community began to use nuclear medicine and 
radiological materials (cancer treatment, for example), and industrial uses such as 
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food and equipment sterilization and well logging were additional sectors that began 
to invest heavily in the peaceful use of nuclear and radiological material.2  
However, with the proliferation of both military and peaceful applications of 
nuclear and radiological material, the risk posed by this material increased, as did 
gaps in the U.S. government’s and international policies to an effective response 
involving these materials. In this chapter, I will look to illustrate how unprepared the 
world, and more specifically the U.S., was to respond to incidents involving nuclear 
material, demonstrated by reactive responses instead of proactive approaches.   
This chapter will also provide some background on significant nuclear and 
radiological incidents that shifted the approach to preparing for a crisis involving 
nuclear or radiological material by providing real-world experience and valuable 
lessons learned. The policies guiding the U.S. government’s response to a nuclear 
or radiological incident have significantly changed over the last fifty years due to 
real-life events. As reactive measures, the creation of laws and policies and 
understanding the need for realistic exercises were the results of actual events and 
the complexities involved. To illustrate this, this chapter will take a brief look at the 
history of nuclear and radiological preparedness over a very important period from 
the 1970s to the end of the 1990s. During this time, several significant events 
occurred that shifted the entire nuclear and radiological response landscape. 
Additionally, the first-hand perspective and recollections of individuals directly 
involved in the development of the U.S. government’s nuclear and radiological 
 
2 Nuclear Regulatory Commission. https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/radiation/around-us/uses-radiation.html. 
2017 
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preparedness and response policies will be used to demonstrate how incidents 
forced the U.S. interagency to constantly evolve in order to most effectively address 
this complex issue. For this chapter, I have interviewed top officials and subject 
matter experts (SMEs) throughout the nuclear and radiological interagency that 
worked during this period. These officials and SMEs worked at the White House, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Energy/National Nuclear 
Security Administration (DOE/NNSA), INTERPOL, Sandia National Laboratories 
(SNL), the Department of State (DoS), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC). These individuals were both Federal officials and contracted 
specialists that assisted the government; the officials interviewed had significant 
roles including Deputy Under Secretary, Nuclear and Radiological Unit Chief, Senior 
Health Physicist, and others. Furthermore, a timeline will be used to illustrate the 
order of events and provide additional context as to why changes in the U.S. 
government’s response policies were made.   
As numerous agencies are involved in an actual response to a nuclear or 
radiological incident, only a few agencies in this chapter will be highlighted. This is 
because there is an overlap in response functions during the response to a nuclear 
or radiological incident depending on numerous factors. Similarly, this chapter will 
explore and discuss trends or political reasons that forced change. A goal of this 
chapter is to provide a holistic view of the U.S. government’s evolving nuclear or 
radiological response policies from some of the top experts and how the continuing 
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evolution of these policies occur to identify trends and emerging threats. This topic 
will be explored in depth in a subsequent chapter.   
Background 
The U.S. and other wealthy nations have been preparing for different 
disasters for well over a century. A bulk of the U.S. government’s preparedness 
policies were initially developed by the Department of Defense (DoD) and their 
mission to fight in a broad spectrum of environments and threats. Because the DoD 
had the most experience handling preparedness, they led the U.S. government’s 
response to nuclear or radiological incidents for much of last century up until the 
1970s. In the 70s, non-military governmental agencies appropriated domestic 
preparedness to nuclear and radiological incidents from DoD.3  
Before the 1970s, emergency preparedness planning functions were 
considered a part of national security duties that were established under the National 
Security Act of 1947. The National Security Act of 1947 shifted the responsibility of 
preparedness to the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM). ODM consolidated with 
the Federal Civil Defense Administration to form the Office of Defense and Civilian 
Mobilization (ODCM), with responsibility for civil defense and emergency 
mobilization coordination in 1958. In 1961, OCDM was designated as the Office of 
Emergency Planning (OEP). OEP coordinated emergency preparedness activities, 
principally in areas of resource utilization, civil defense, economic stabilization, post-
 
3 Department of Homeland Security, Civil Defense and Homeland Security:  A Short History of National 
Preparedness Efforts, September 2006 
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attack rehabilitation, and government organization and continuity. OEP would be 
then designated as the Office of Emergency Preparedness in 1968.4 
In the 1970s, the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act created the system in place today in which a Presidential disaster 
declaration during an emergency triggers financial and physical assistance through 
FEMA. Commonly referred to as the Stafford Act, among other things it gives FEMA 
the responsibility for coordinating government-wide relief efforts. 
On October 11, President Gerald R. Ford signed the Energy Reorganization Act of 
1974. This act abolished the Atomic Energy Commission, the original agency that 
was created in 1946 to manage the development, use, and control of atomic 
(nuclear) energy for military and civilian applications,5 and created three new 
Federal entities: the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and an Energy Resources Council 
composed of the Secretaries of State and Interior, the administrators of ERDA, and 
the director of the Office of Management and Budget.6  With regards to nuclear and 
radiological incidents, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 required the 
Administrator of ERDA and the Secretary of Defense to review the feasibility of 
transferring the military functions formerly vested in the Atomic Energy Commission 
to the Department of Defense or to other Federal agencies.7  
 
4 Department of Homeland Security. Civil Defense and Homeland Security: A Short History of National 
Preparedness Efforts. September 2006 
5 Nuclear Regulatory Commission. https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/atomic-energy-
commission.html. 
6 Department of Energy, A History of the Energy Research and Development Administration, March 1982 
7 Ibid 
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The possible transfer of these functions, which included weapon development 
programs, the control of highly sensitive nuclear weapon information, and certain 
nondefense related programs including the development and maintenance of naval 
reactors, space nuclear systems, military power reactors, and the production of 
special nuclear materials, reflected continuing congressional concern over the issue 
of civilian control of technology, information, and assets that had been primarily 
under the purview of the DoD. In January 1976, following a year of study, concern 
was raised about lack of focus being a detriment to a strong nuclear weapons 
program; this was partially owed to the split in the management and funding 
responsibilities between different agencies8. It was recommended instead that the 
nuclear weapon program and complexes be retained within ERDA, but have a 
budget of its own, separate from the budget for energy programs. The Assistant 
Administrator for National Security would be responsible for seeing that the weapon 
program received priority in the use of laboratories and production facilities, while 
nonweapon defense-related programs would be under the direction of the Assistant 
Administrator for Nuclear Energy. The unique capability of the weapon research 
laboratories to perform significant nonnuclear research in the energy development 
field was another factor in the final decision to leave the division of military 
application and the associated nuclear activities within the Energy Research and 
 
8 25. Assistant Administrator for National Security to Administrator, April 16, 1976; Roger M. Anders, “The 
Office of Military Application,” IODE History Series, Vol. 1, No. 1, Aug. 1980; “Funding and Management 
Alternatives for ERDA Military Application and Restricted Data Functions,” ERDA 97, Jan. 1976; Section 307(b), 
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as reprinted in Compilation of Energy-Related Legislation, published by the 




Development Administration.9 An Interagency Committee on Radiological 
Assistance operated under an ad hoc arrangement until 1961 at which time a formal 
Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan (IRAP) was signed by the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC), (predecessor to the DOE), the DoD, the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (DHEW), the Department of Labor (DOL), the Department of 
the Treasury, the Department of Commerce, the Office of Civil Defense Mobilization, 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), the Post Office Department, and the Interstate Commerce 
Commission. In 1973, the AEC, the DHEW, the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency 
(DCPA) (formerly Civil Defense), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
signed an agreement to assist each other in responding to a radiological incident at 
a fixed facility.10  
The AEC was responsible for maintaining the 1973 IRAP, which superseded 
the earlier 1961 agreement. The Energy Reorganization Action of 1974 abolished 
the AEC and created the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Energy 
Research and Development Agency (ERDA, another predecessor organization to 
the DOE). The responsibilities of the AEC were divided between the two newly 
created agencies; this division became effective January 19, 1975 by Executive 
Order.11 The NRC took the lead responsibility for planning and training and the 
ERDA had responsibilities for working with state and local governments to 
 
9 Ibid 
10 Federation of American Scientists. https://fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/doctrine/national/frerp.htm 
11 U.S. Department of Energy. The Atomic Energy Commission. July 1983  
 
 12 
coordinate radiological capabilities. The Federal agency planning was further 
expanded to cover transportation accidents and the agreements were signed by the 
NRC, EPA, ERDA, DHEW, Department of Transportation (DOT), DCPA, Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and the Federal Preparedness 
Administration (FPA).12  
Patrick Daly, who held the position of Senior Military Advisor to the 
Ambassador at Large for Counterterrorism to the Department of State, shared his 
insights on the events and thinking that led to the creation of ERDA. His insights are 
worth quoting in full:   
 “It started out with the Atomic Energy Commission, when the primary focus of 
the U.S. government was bomb creation and use during war time. This 
started to evolve with the increasing civilian use of radiological material; 
industries such as nuclear medicine, research reactors, things of that nature.  
So ERDA was created to evolve with the diversifying use of radiological and 
nuclear material, incorporating civilian uses and war applications.  Then the 
oil crisis in 1979 happened, and then President Carter, being a former nuclear 
submarine officer, created the DOE.  Carter had attended the Naval Academy 
with Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, who is considered the father of the U.S. 
Navy’s nuclear submarine program. So, Carter, having this nuclear 
background, formed the Department of Energy.  One of the accidents that 
occurred during Carter’s tenure as President was an incident involving an 
intercontinental ballistic missile loaded with a 9 megaton nuclear warhead, 
about 50 miles outside of Little Rock, Arkansas.  I was at the Pentagon at the 
time, and the whole Air Force operations system, it just went crazy because 
of this accident.  The technicians at this missile facility dropped a wrench or 
socket or something and hit a fuel tank on the rocket and punctured it, and 
rocket fuel starts pouring out.  They had to evacuate the silo.  It was serious. I 
can remember going 24/7 at the Pentagon. A majority of the response to this 
accident was by the military.  This policy started to change with the creation of 
DOE and the development of their response teams, the NEST [Nuclear 
Emergency Support Team] and REAC/TS [Radiation Emergency Assistance 
Center/Training Site].  The military kept the kinetic duties of the U.S. 
government’s domestic response to nuclear-based attacks or incidents with 
specialized military units tasked with missions that are of national level 
 
12 NRC. Backgrounder on Nuclear Insurance and Disaster Relief. May 3, 2019 
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importance until the FBI appropriated the domestic, armed response mission 
due to concerns about using Department of Defense forces on U.S. soil.”13   
 
Mr. Daly had provided great context that the transition and responsibility started to 
evolve that incident can take place out of war time scenario that would further the 
need for public agencies to be more involved in planning, preparing and exercising 
for nuclear and radiological incidents. 
At around this same time, the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) and its preceding agencies were to cover any human-caused or natural 
events. Given the many years of congressional acquiescence in this administration 
of the Stafford Act, this administrative interpretation would normally be regarded as 
authoritative and correct. Prior to the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, legislation largely 
defined a “disaster” as an environmental event (a tornado or earthquake, for 
instance). But when discussion among policy makers was made regarding a nuclear 
disaster the consensus opinion was that Congress would take the lead to alleviate 
any suffering in such a situation. In 1974, the Stafford Act under consideration 
referred to the “natural” hazards that will be covered would also include “any one of 
a number of natural hazards or other catastrophes causing damage that requires 
emergency assistance.”14This shifted the responsibility of FEMA, as well as provided 
authority, to support a broader scope to include the consequence aspects to a 
nuclear and radiological incident. Extensive hearings were held, which resulted in a 
focus on the aid needed during a disaster, not how the disaster was caused. To 
clarify whether the Stafford Act can properly be used to cover man-made disasters, 
 
13 Daly, Patrick. Personal Interview. March 20, 2020. 
14 120 Cong. Rec. 4169. statement of Sen. Burdick, floor manager. 1974 
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a list provided by FEMA includes all the emergencies that have been covered since 
May 1, 1953, by the Stafford Act or its predecessors, which also includes human-
caused disasters have been covered for as long as there has been specific disaster 
legislation.15 
The inadequacies of 1979 and 1989:  Addressing the threat posed by nuclear 
and radiological incidents. 
 
A significant period to understand the evolving response to nuclear and 
radiological incidents is the ten years between 1979 and 1989. The world saw 
firsthand the impact of wide scale nuclear and radiological events that occurred 
outside of military applications. During this period, a domestic and an international 
nuclear reactor accident occurred, one of the biggest nuclear exercises ever 
conducted took place in the U.S., new policies were created to combat nuclear and 
radiological terrorism, and a radiological accident became a case study in the 
consequences that can result from the contamination of a wide area and population 
by radiological material. 
In a 1977 agreement, or memorandum of understanding, the NRC agreed to 
notify the ERDA immediately of any emergency that may require its assistance, and 
ERDA agreed to provide Aerial Radiation Measuring System (ARMS) and Nuclear 
Emergency Search Team (NEST) resources to the extent they were available under 





The NRC’s responsibilities now focused on licensing and inspecting reactors 
and no longer had the capacity to do expansive radiation monitoring. The ERDA also 
agreed to take responsibility for conducting radiological surveys and mapping at all 
NRC sites. The ERDA developed an internal response plan, which included an 
Emergency Action Coordinating Team to coordinate any response actions.17 In the 
same year, the ERDA became the DOE. All agreements and response capabilities 
housed at the ERDA were maintained by the newly formed Department of Energy.18 
Owing to a series of incidents that occurred between 1979 and 1989, existing 
policies and responsibilities detailing the response to a nuclear or radiological 
incident were reexamined. This period provided key takeaways in communications, 
radioactivity measurements, planning, training, and interagency coordination 
addressing the nuclear and radiological threat. 
On March 28, 1979 the Three Mile Island Power Station partial meltdown 
occurred. The accident started with a minor malfunction affecting the cooling system 
that lead to a shutdown of the reactor. Although no significant health effects were 
ever reported as a result of this incident, the accident had a powerful psychological 
impact and altered the societal perception of nuclear power.19  
Despite the lack of medical related issues, psychological, social, and 
communications issues were identified. These issues seemed to come as a surprise 
to responders and may have only been truly learned in a real-life shutdown of this 
 
17 FRMAC. The Evolution of the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center. 
18 https://www.nnss.gov/docs/docs_FRMAC/FRMACHistoryFinal.pdf 
19 https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/three-mile-island-
accident.aspx (World Nuclear Association, 2001) 
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public magnitude. The Three Mile Island incident lead to several lessons learned, 
including:  
1. The need for continuing improvement in the performance of all nuclear power 
plants and the training to respond. In 1980. the NRC Authorization Acts of 
1980 directed the NRC to establish emergency preparedness as a criterion 
for licensing commercial Nuclear Power Plants (NPP). Specifically, the NRC 
Authorization Acts prohibit the NRC from issuing an operating license for an 
NPP unless it finds that “there exists a State, local, or utility plan which 
provides reasonable assurance that public health and safety is not 
endangered by operation of the facility concerned.” The acts also provide for 
the NRC to consult FEMA in developing standards for evaluating 
plans/procedures and in making individual determinations that the 
plans/procedures provide reasonable assurance for protecting public health 
and safety20. The NRC revised its regulations in 10 CFR Part 50 to 
incorporate additional emergency preparedness requirements, including 16 
Planning Standards for onsite and offsite emergency response 
plans/procedures.21 
 
2. The accident provided a better understanding of fuel melting and highlighted 
how the movies in that time were misleading the public by inaccurately 
depicting the meltdown breaching the reactor vessel and the containment 
structure.  
 
3. Public confidence in nuclear energy, particularly in the U.S., declined sharply 
following the Three Mile Island accident. It was a major cause of the decline 
in nuclear construction through the 1980s and 1990s (see figure 1)22 
 
 





Figure 1 - Decline in Construction in the 80s 
Following the Three Mile Island incident, the DOE stood up the Federal 
Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC). FRMAC is tied to the development of 
Federal agency planning that followed the Three Mile Island accident. At the time of 
the accident, the DOE and other agencies had an existing response agreement,23 
but they were not formalized, and specific agencies did not have well defined 
responsibilities. 
FRMAC was formed as a reaction to gaps in response procedures that were 
exposed by the Three Mile Island incident. Dan Blumenthal, Consequence 
Management Program Manager in NNSA's Office of Nuclear Incident Response 
stated that: 
 “aerial measurement assets used during the Three Mile Island 
response would eventually become a part of what is now FRMAC. We 
consider the birth of our office 1985 and was developed to coordinate all 




24 Blumenthal, Dan, Personal Interview, March 25, 2020 
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After the Three Mile Island incident, President Jimmy Carter and Congress 
directed the impacted Federal agencies to develop a plan to provide for an 
integrated Federal response to radiological emergencies. It was recognized that 
when a major radiological incident impacts the public, states may need federal 
assistance to characterize and assess the radiological conditions. This led to the 
development of the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP). The 
FRERP was the guideline used in establishing FRMAC and described the roles of 
various Federal agencies involved in the response and coordination of Federal 
activities with the states and responsible agencies. In 2004, this document was 
superseded by the National Response Plan (NRP). During a domestic nuclear or 
radiological incident, FRMAC is initially established at the incident location by DOE 
to provide an operational framework for coordinating and managing all offsite 
Federal radiological monitoring and assessment activities. Following the emergency 
phase of an incident, the EPA takes the lead in ensuring appropriate health 
protection guidelines are followed and recommending further actions.25 
As a result of the Three Mile Island incident, Executive Order 12148 and the 
Presidential Directive of December 7, 1979 transferred the lead Federal role in 
offsite emergency planning and preparedness activities from the NRC to FEMA.26  
On the FEMA side, the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) 
Program was stood up. President Carter further established a Presidential 





investigation of the accident. Among its findings, the Kemeny Commission called for 
the formation of an emergency preparedness framework specific to nuclear power 
plant incidents. A portion of this responsibility would be allotted to the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The Commission made four 
recommendations that affected FEMA: 
1.Before a utility is granted an operating license for a new nuclear power 
plant, the state within which that plant is to be sited must have an emergency 
response plan reviewed and approved by the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA). The agency should assess the criteria and 
procedures now used for evaluating state and local government plans and for 
determining their ability to activate the plans. FEMA must assure adequate 
provision, where necessary, for multi-state planning.  
2.The responsibility at the federal level for radiological emergency planning, 
including planning for coping with radiological releases, should rest with 
FEMA. In this process, FEMA should consult with other agencies, including 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the appropriate health and 
environmental agencies.  
3.The state must effectively coordinate its planning with the utility and with 
local officials in the area where the plant is to be located.  
4.States with plants already operating must upgrade their plans to the 
requirements to be Nuclear Regulatory Commission Authorization, Public Law 
96-295, June 30, 1980, Section 304. This authorization requires the President 
to prepare and publish a "National Contingency Plan" (subsequently renamed 
the FRERP) to provide for expeditious, efficient, and coordinated action by 
appropriate Federal agencies to protect the public health and safety in case of 
accidents at commercial nuclear power plants. 
The provisions of Executive Order 12241 of Sept. 29, 1980, directed the publication 
of a plan to protect the public health and safety in case of accidents at nuclear power 
facilities and delegated the responsibility to the Director of FEMA.27 
Chernobyl 
 




On April 26, 1986, a major meltdown at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant 
occurred near the city of Pripyat in the northern part of the Ukrainian SSR. The 
Chernobyl incident is considered by many in the field as one of two nuclear disasters 
that were graded as a maximum severity incident (the other being the Fukushima 
Daiichi disaster in Japan) and is regarded as the worst nuclear accident in recorded 
history. 
Alongside radiation-induced deaths and diseases, a World Health 
Organization (WHO) report labels the mental health impact of Chernobyl as “the 
largest public health problem created by the accident” and partially attributes this 
damaging psychological impact to a lack of accurate information. These problems 
manifest as negative self-assessments of health, belief in a shortened life 
expectancy, lack of initiative, and dependency on assistance from the state. 
On that day in 1986, a sudden surge of power during a reactor systems test 
destroyed the power plant’s Unit 4 nuclear reactor. The accident and the fire that 
followed released massive amounts of radioactive material into the environment.28  
The reactor flaws and human error are attributed as the initial cause of the incident; 
complications were compounded by the response. 31 people died within a few 
weeks of the accident. Soviet authorities started evacuating people from the area 
around Chernobyl within 36 hours of the accident. Eventually, 115,000 people were 
evacuated. The Soviet government subsequently resettled another 220,000 people. 
In addition to initial countermeasures that were deemed inadequate, several lessons 
were learned as a result of the accident.29 
• The need for stringent emergency preparedness plans. Even with the 
Chernobyl reactor’s poor design, officials could have averted many 
radioactive exposures to the population with an effective emergency 
response.  
• The need for timely alerts and notifications. Chernobyl plant operators 
concealed the accident from authorities and the local population, and thus the 
 
28 https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/chernobyl-bg.html 
29 Nuclear Energy Institute. Chernobyl Accident and Its Consequences. May 2019 
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government did not even begin limited evacuations until about 36 hours after 
the accident.  
• The necessity of protecting the food chain. Since authorities did not 
promptly disclose details of the Chernobyl accident, many people 
unknowingly consumed contaminated milk and food.30.  
Around this same time, the U.S. government and the interagency began to 
observe several incidents taking place around the world involving terrorism. The 
U.S. government and the Reagan administration took notice and drew attention to 
the threat posed by the use of nuclear and radiological weapons by nonstate actors.  
Addressing this nonstate threat appeared to become a national security priority. 
President Ronald Reagan directed the development and adoption of several 
National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) to include NSDD 30, Managing 
Terrorist Incidents, NSDD 138, Combatting Terrorism, NSDD 179, Task force on 
Combatting Terrorism, that was assigned in July 1985 and eventually tasked to the 
then Vice President George Bush. This task force began a shift to developing a 
proactive stance on nuclear and radiological threats that would fully develop during 
the mid 90’s. While much of the world took a reactive stance to incidents involving 
nuclear or radiological material, the U.S. began to place a specific emphasis on 
conducting exercises and other trainings focused on this issue. 
Mighty Derringer 
In December 1986, a secret exercise in Indianapolis involving multiple U.S. 
counterterrorism units from both Federal agencies and the DoD took place. The 




taking place on U.S. soil. From this exercise, the U.S. and participating agencies 
were able to identify multiple issues in planning and responding to a terrorist attack 
involving nuclear material. Additionally, the DOE was able to exercise its Nuclear 
Emergency Search Team (NEST), a group assigned to respond to plausible nuclear 
terrorism threats. Currently, NEST (now the Nuclear Emergency Support Team) 
constantly conducts exercises to 1) assess its capability to respond to a terrorist 
device involving the use of nuclear material and 2) test its ability to effectively 
coordinate and integrate with critical Federal and DoD units during a crisis. 31 
A unique aspect of this exercise was that the U.S. was exercising both an  
international and domestic response to an improvised nuclear device (IND). Pat 
Daly, who played a critical role in the planning and executing of this exercise, 
emphasized the importance and lasting impact of this event: 
“It was the first big IND exercise, and it involved the DOE, the DoD, and the 
State Department.  It took place on a portion of the Nevada test site.  As part 
of the exercise, the exercise planners created a notional country which they 
called Montrev, and they exercised an IND threat in Montrev.  The DOS had 
the lead and coordinated with the DoD’s Joint Special Operations Command 
(JSOC), JSOC is a subcomponent of the U.S. Special Operations Command, 
and is tasked with operations of the highest sensitivity and national 
importance.  Units that fall under JSOC include the U.S. Army’s special 
missions’ unit (often referred to as Delta Force) and the U.S. Navy’s Special 
Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU), popularly known as SEAL Team 
Six. A second portion of the scenario involved an IND in Indianapolis with FBI 
working with DoD.  I supported the part of the scenario in Montrev and came 
out with the emergency support team.  My role was the ambassador for the 
state of Montrev assigned to the U.S. embassy.  DoD deployed all of their 
assets to Nevada to test the scenario.”32  
 
 
31 George Washington University, National Security Archive. Mighty Derringer Exercise 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb380/ 
32 Daly, Patrick.  Interview 
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The significance of this secret exercise was extremely important for the interagency 
response to nuclear and radiological planners and coordination. It provided a great 
deal of follow on actions that would be carried forward into policy and planning. 
Furthermore, it helped highlight the significance of diplomatic relations during an 
incident.  
But the incident and the difficulties involved in responding to the threat 
convinced senior leaders that there was a need for a dedicated capability to deal 
with any attempt at nuclear terrorism. From its inception, NEST devoted 
considerable time and effort to conducting exercises designed to allow the team to 
test its readiness, procedures, and equipment in a variety of scenarios. In addition, 
since confronting a nuclear threat would involve not only NEST but a multitude of 
organizations, exercises provided an opportunity to identify potential problems in 
interagency cooperation.33  
MIGHTY DERRINGER was a particularly notable exercise in exploring the 
organizational, governmental, and technical problems that might arise in responding 
to a nuclear terrorist threat. While the existence of MIGHTY DERRINGER has been 
reported previously, the documents obtained by the National Security Archive and 
provide far more detail than previously available, including information on the 
scenario, results, and after-action assessments of the assorted organizations 
involved. Since NEST and these other government entities are still critical 
components of America's counter-terrorist capability, these records are valuable for 
 
33 Jeffrey T. Richelson, Defusing Armageddon: Inside NEST, America's Secret Nuclear Bomb Squad 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 2009), pp. 19-21 
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the insight they offer into how a current-day nuclear detection operation would unfold 
and particularly what kinds of problems might be encountered.34  
The scenario allowed for all aspects of a possible response to a nuclear 
terrorist threat to be practiced; from initial assessment of the threat to the 
management of the consequences of a detonation. The documents detailed the core 
aspects of a response, including intelligence collection, technical and behavioral 
assessments, search, access/defeat of terrorist forces, recovery of a device, 
diagnostics, hazards and effects estimation, disablement and damage limitation, 
safe transportation of the device, and consequence management of a detonation. In 
addition, they also drew lessons from a variety of important aspects of a response, 
including security, command and control, communications, logistics, radiological 
measurement and containment, weather forecasting, public information, and 
interaction with local officials.35  
William Chambers, a NEST member and site controller for the Indianapolis 
component of the exercise, wrote that the coordination and integration that occurred 
between the FBI's Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) - The FBI’s Hostage Rescue Team 
was formed to address missions of national importance that occur on U.S. soil. It’s 
considered the domestic equivalent of the Army and Navy’s special missions units 
that fall under JSOC,  NEST, and Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) personnel 
was "excellent" but that "the joint procedures for withdrawing the HRT and survivors, 
 




securing the perimeter, and clearing access to the device need clarification."36 
Several other observations from the exercise included great communications, weak 
senior official involvement, and the gap of not establishing a “public affairs” function. 
One observer stated it was the most realistic exercise ever conducted by the NEST 
community.37 
Goiania 
If Chernobyl was the worst incident involving the inadvertent release of 
nuclear material on a population, the Goiania incident can be considered the worst 
incident involving the accidental release of radiological material on a population. 
In September 1987, an abandoned cesium-137 teletherapy device, used to 
treat certain cancers, was stolen in Goiania, Brazil. The device’s licensed and 
regulated entity had left the unit in a vacated building without notifying the proper 
Brazilian authorities. Two individuals entered the vacated facility and discovered the 
abandoned teletherapy unit and breached it, removing the portion of the machine 
containing the radioactive cesium-137 source. These individuals had no idea what 
the intended use of the material was or that it contained radioactive material; they 
thought the device could be sold for scrap. They then took the device to their homes 
and further dismantled it, rupturing the layer of protective material surrounding the 
radioactive source. Fragments of the cesium-137 within the device, roughly the size 
of a grain of rice and glowing blue, were distributed to several families in the 
 




community. After a period of five days, a number of persons were expressing 
gastrointestinal distress due to their exposure to the radiation from the cesium-137. 
The symptoms were not initially recognized as a result of exposure to radiation. 
Eventually, one of the persons irradiated connected the illnesses with the cesium-
137 and took samples of the radioactive material to the public health department in 
the city. This began a chain of events which led to the discovery of the cesium-137 
exposure and contamination of the immediate environment and population. 
Subsequently, the Brazilian government mobilized a major emergency response. 
Numerous individuals incurred external and internal exposure and the emergency 
response had to deal with both this and major contamination throughout the city and 
beyond. In total, some 112,000 persons were monitored, of whom 249 were 
contaminated owing to the way they had handled the radioactive material.  
In the end, 4 died within four weeks, 112,000 patients were monitored, 249 
were contaminated either externally or internally, and 85 houses were deemed 
significantly contaminated. These homes were demolished and over 3,500 m3 of 
waste was collected and stored at a specialized facility.38 
The accident had a major economic impact on the area, depressing trade with  
other areas of the country and world. Frightened by the prospect of radioactive 
contamination, neighboring provinces isolated Goiania and boycotted its products. 
The price of their manufactured goods dropped 40 percent and stayed low for more 
than a month. Tourism, a primary industry, collapsed and recent population gains 
 
38 International Atomic Energy Agency. The Radiological Accident in Goiania.  1988 
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were reversed by business regression. Total economic losses were estimated at 
hundreds of millions of dollars. A key lesson learned from this incident is the 
importance of enhancing the broader understanding of radiation.39 
Key take aways from the incident included: 
• Nothing reduces the liability or responsibility of the individual designated for 
the radioactive source. Sources removed or abandoned present a major 
hazard. 
• An adequate system of information is essential to avert panic on the part of 
the public. 
• An adequate system of social and psychological support should be provided 
following a radiological accident causing serious contamination.  
• The effectiveness of international assistance following a radiological accident 
depends on the infrastructure of the country concerned.  
• For decision making and the organization of working teams following a 
radiological accident, the hierarchy should be well defined.40  
 
The 90s had several significant events that carried us into the millennia.   
Although the 90s started to show that we were learning from our mistakes 
and better preparing for accidents involving nuclear and radioactive material, we still 
hadn’t learned how to conduct a large level response at a national level. 
Furthermore, terrorism began to become of great concern, posing new problems that 
hadn’t fully been considered with respect to the use of nuclear and radiological 
material. “Terrorism started becoming more prevalent. The hostage taking in Beirut 
and Iran, bombings at U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania… weapons of mass 
destruction (WMDs) started to become important,” stated Daly.41  The U.S. 
 
39 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Revisiting Goiania. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1100/ML110030911.pdf. 
1993 
40 IAEA.  Radiation Sources: Lessons Learned from Goiania. 1998 
41 Daly, Patrick. Interview 
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government and its response in general had started to shift to a more proactive 
state, but had been minimal up until this point. Most of the training and exercise prior 
to the 90s were classified so the first responder didn’t even have an understanding 
of the threat posed by nuclear or radioactive material. There wasn’t much training 
between all levels of government before then. 
“In 1980, nations around the world signed the Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Material in Vienna, Austria,” stated former Deputy Chief of 
Counterterrorism at the Department of Justice, Scott Glick. “We were a signatory, 
which lead to the enactment of Title 18, starting to put policy and law in place” as he 
elaborated regarding prosecuting criminals and terrorists for trafficking and using 
nuclear and radioactive material. “We agreed with nations that this a bad thing. One 
thing we can see, under section 831 (g), the Attorney General can ask to enact the 
Posse Comitatus Act when civilian authorities don’t’ have capability, but no 
attacks.”42Essentially, this meant that the Attorney General can authorize the use of 
DoD personnel on U.S. soil even in the absence of an actual attack. 
He further continued that “In the 1990s, terrorist started using WMDs around 
the world. The 1993 World Trade Center bombing, 1995 was the Oklahoma City 
bombing, the 1995 Tokyo subway sarin gas attacks by Aum Shinrikyo, in 1996 there 
were the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, in 1995, President Clinton felt 
that the 1980 Convention was not adequate. He issued PDD 39 to combat this.”43  
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39, which directed U.S. Policy on 
 
42 Glick, Scott. Personal Interview. March 19, 2020 
43 Ibid 
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Counterterrorism, was a significant document.44  “We needed to determine who was 
the lead Federal agency to deal with the law enforcement aspect. Clinton decided 
that he was going to organize this. The PDD assigns to FBI as the lead for crisis 
management and FEMA for consequence management. If we capture a terrorist, 
everyone is involved to help. To enhance these capabilities, we needed to improve 
response from lead agency responsibilities and take a whole of government 
approach.”45   
The signing of the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) 
was also a significant step in aligning U.S. policy with the growing threat. FRERP 
established an organized and integrated capability for timely, coordinated response 
by Federal agencies to a peacetime radiological emergency with the objective of 
outlining public and private sector response and the coordination of Federal 
agencies.46 
President Clinton responded with several actions in his PDD. Glick continued: 
 “In 1996, Congress passed the Defense against WMDs Act.  9/11 was the 
change. After Clinton issued PDD 39, the Attorney General established the 
Attorney Critical Incident Response Group (ACIRG) to provide expert 
assistance to the Attorney General and U.S. Attorneys’ Offices in the event of 
a crisis47, Attorney General Janet Reno developed this for attorneys.  I was 
appointed to the team in 1996.  We then had to ask, ‘how do you organize the 
cabinet’?  You have to issue an NSDD, PDD, on how to organize our 
resources. This became a change for the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
lawyers to assist in response. I then was a prosecutor that was added to 
exercises to prepare to prosecute criminals and terrorists.  This is contained 
in an Inspector General report that goes through its history.  ACIRG became 
critical because of the FBI SWAT teams and the incident at Waco, if lawyers 
 
44 Clinton Digital Library. PDD-39 - U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, 6/21/1995 
45 Glick, Scott. Interview 
46 Federation of American Scientists, Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), May 1, 1996 
47 Office of Inspector General.  Review of the Critical Incident Response Plans of the United States Attorneys’ 
Offices. https://oig.justice.gov/reports/EOUSA/e0401/appd.htm.  December 2003 
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aren’t integrated, how do you ask who shot who and killed who?  We had to 
integrate with FBI and DoD.”48  
 
The question arises, how did the lack of integration between the FBI and DoD 
impact the exercises and preparedness. Glick’s insights on this question are worth 
citing in full:   
“When Clinton signed PDD 39, It had specific requirements to exercise for the 
FBI. Clinton was creating an interagency exercise committee within the White 
House.  On the Executive Branch, Clinton was issuing directives.  Then 
congress started allocating money to that direction.  The precipices for this 
was probably with Ruby Ridge, Waco, Oklahoma City…. we need to do this in 
a better way.  There wasn’t a lot of exercises going till then.  When I was 
appointed ACIRG, I worked with DoD on joint exercises which I felt was the 
turning point.   
With respect to terrorism or using WMDs, the big change was a recognition 
that we were slow to respond. We started seeing that terrorists might be able 
to do this.  The Tokyo gas attack was evidence and we need to try to get 
ahead of this.  It was reactive.  In large part, when government tried to spend 
resources, they at the time were fixing instead of planning ahead. So, in 1996, 
we need to throw money, which came from the defense against WMDs Act 
and was a big deal.”49 
 
The reference Glick made was to Public Law 104-201, section 1411, Response to 
Threats of Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction. From that report, 
Congress had several findings of significance with respect to nuclear and 
radiological threats 
• Terrorist groups have already conducted a radiological attack in Russia. 
• There is a significant and growing threat of attack by WMDs on targets that 
are not military targets in the usual sense of the term. 
• The threat posed to citizens of the US by nuclear and radiological weapons 
delivered by unconventional means is significant and growing. 
• The United States lack adequate planning and countermeasures to address 
the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism. 
• The Department of Energy has established a Nuclear Emergency Response 
Team which is available in case of a nuclear or radiological emergency. 
 
48 Glick, Scott.  Interview 
49 Glick, Scott, Interview 
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• State and local emergency response personnel are not adequately prepared 
or trained for incidents involving nuclear and radiological materials. 
• Exercises of the Federal, State and local response to nuclear and radiological 
terrorism have revealed serious deficiencies in preparedness and severe 
problems of coordination. 
• Development of, and allocation of responsibilities for, effective 
countermeasures to nuclear and radiological terrorism in the United States 
requires well-coordinated participation of many Federal agencies, and careful 
planning by the Federal Government and State and local governments. 
• Training and exercises can significantly improve the preparedness of State 
and local emergency response personnel for emergencies involving nuclear 
and radiological weapons or related material. 
• Sharing of the expertise and capabilities of the Department of Defense, which 
traditionally has provided assistance to the Federal, State, and local officials 
in neutralizing, dismantling, and disposing of explosive ordnance, as well as 
radiological materials can be a vital contribution to the development and 
deployment of countermeasures against nuclear weapons of mass 
destruction. 
• The United States lacks effective policy coordination regarding the threat 
posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
 
Also in the publication, the term “weapon of mass destruction” is defined as 
any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or 
serious bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release, 
dissemination, or impact of a) toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors; b) a 
disease organism; or c) radiation or radioactivity. The term “weapon of mass 
destruction” and its official definition are of great significance as it had long standing 
ramifications on how things were prosecuted, but also exercised. This essentially 
created a framework for identification of which agencies have the lead during an 
incident, which agencies would be responsible for support, and thresholds for even 
activity of radioactive material that might be considered.  
The report further outlined requirements set forth by Congress on the:  
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1) assessment of the capabilities of the Federal government to prevent and 
respond to terrorist incidents involving WMDs and to support state and 
local prevention and response efforts; 
  
2) requirements for improvements in those capabilities; and  
 
3) the measures that should be taken to achieve such improvements, 
including additional resources and legislative authorities that would be 
required.   
 
This report needed to be developed and provided back to Congress no later than 
January 31, 1997 (296 of Statute 110).50   
The beginning of a shift from reaction to being proactive 
As demonstrated by the history of the U.S. government’s policy regarding 
responding to a nuclear or radioactive incident, the creation of multiple organizations 
to address this problem, and the ownerships (sometimes overlapping) of different 
responsibilities and capabilities, the response architecture used by the U.S. 
government was built predominately on reactive experience from the 1970s until a 
shift occurred in the late 1990s to 2000. And as the world and the U.S. continued to 
shift its focus from preparing for nuclear and radiological accidents to incidents in 
which terrorist or other non-state actors use nuclear or radiological material in an 
attack, the DOE made one of its greatest changes to deal with both state and non-
state actors: the establishment of the National Nuclear Security Administration 
(NNSA). The NNSA was established by Congress in 2000 as a semi-autonomous 
agency within the U.S. Department of Energy responsible for enhancing national 
security through the military application of nuclear science. NNSA maintains and 
 
50 Public Law 104-201. U.S. Code. https://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=110&page=2717. 
September 1996 
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enhances the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons 
stockpile without nuclear explosive testing; works to reduce the global danger from 
weapons of mass destruction; provides the U.S. Navy with safe and effective nuclear 
propulsion; and responds to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the United 
States and abroad.51  Furthermore, NNSA supports the safety and security of non-
military applications both domestically and internationally. 
Jay Tilden is the current Associate Administrator and Deputy Under Secretary 
for Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation at the NNSA. The office and entities 
he oversees are responsible for the NNSA’s mission of effectively responding to 
intentional or accidental incidents involving nuclear or radioactive material, often in 
coordination with other interagency partners. Speaking to the evolution of U.S. policy 
regarding nuclear and radiological security measures, he stated that,  
“Generally speaking, if some big radiological or nuclear event took 
place prior to the 90s, the civil authorities and regulatory base were 
overwhelmed.  The military had been regularly in charge for a radiological 
environment. The military had the predominance of the capabilities of 
Chemical Biological Nuclear and Radiological.  In the post-Cold War era, a lot 
of countries atrophied their military component on radiological or nuclear 
response.  In the 90s, we started having the debate of the nuclear energy 
sector.  The capabilities started to shift to the civil side to accident 
preparedness.  It wasn’t until the end of the 90s we started to get to the idea 
of nuclear terrorism.   
They were serious attempt at nuclear in 90s. Once Aum Shinrikyo was 
rounded up after the Tokyo attack, it was apparent that they were trying to get 
hands on uranium in Australia. Al Qaeda too. 52   
 
Summary of the Evolution of US Policy  
 
51 National Nuclear Security Administration. https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/about-nnsa.  
52 Tilden, Jay. Personal Interview.  March 26, 2020. 
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For a summary of the events to 1979 to 2000 and the attendant evolution of 
U.S. policy towards incidents involving nuclear or radioactive material, the timeline 
below provides milestones and key events that occurred and some of the reactions 
and lessons learned. This is not an all-encompassing list and is only provided as a 




The shift from being reactive to proactive when developing national-level 
policy is not a simple task, especially when it involves the highly technical and 
classified problem set of effectively responding to nuclear weapons and radiological 
material in the hands of terrorists or hostile nations. This chapter focused on the 
developments in a time period (1970s-2000) being instrumental to the evolution of 
preparedness. This was a development at the institutional and federal level with both 
response and policy. This shift was reactive to finally closing the chapter with the 
evidence on a desire by the Clinton administration wanting to get ahead of the 
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problem. Insights from key individuals in the field provided context to validate this 
during an important stage in nuclear and radiological preparedness. It is 
understandable for many reasons why the U.S. was playing catch for most of the 
period as each incident provided more understanding and experience of the issues, 
risk, and need for policy, capabilities, and planning to address future incidents. 
In the next chapter, as the world starts to get a handle on preparing for 
nuclear and radiological incidents, complications arise by the spread of 
decentralized terrorist organizations, international criminal groups, and pockets of 
instability throughout the world where regions exist in which no official government 
authority is recognized. The focus will now shift to the U.S. Government’s need for 














Chapter 2.  
 
How has radiological security evolved since the turn of the century? 
In this chapter, first-hand experience from the last ten years consulting on, 
planning, designing, and facilitating a variety radiological preparedness exercises 
will provide some relevant context on the evolution of radiological security this 
century. This experience has been gained from running a company that provides 
consultation on responding to radiological security incidents and coordination and 
integration of “whole of government” during a radiological security incident. During 
these ten years, there has been a tremendous change in the security, preparedness, 
exercises, and coordination to address variety of threats posed by radiological 
material (during either an accident or deliberate use). The need to be well organized 
at all levels of government (Federal, state, local, and tribal) is essential to ensure a 
proper and efficient response so that if radioactive material were stolen or used in a 
way to harm a population, the U.S. has the ability to rapidly respond to contain, 
recapture, mitigate, and recover from said incident. 
Deliberate radiological security incidents can occur via an attack during the 
transportation of these materials, at the facility that has the regulatory license to 
have and use these materials for legitimate purposes, and, in a whole new 
dimension, can involve new methods, like a cybersecurity attack. Since the security 
landscape has changed so drastically over the last 20 years, as well as the areas in 
which countries like the U.S. are vulnerable, the need to plan, prepare, train, and 
exercise are vital to ensure that all levels of governments function cohesively.   
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The United States had taken some measures to address radiological security 
incidents pre-2000, but the structure, coordination and response didn’t start to 
mature until incidents post-2000. Integration and coordination between Federal 
government agencies and state and local organizations didn’t start emerging until 
the end of the 2000s and hasn’t reached a point of maturity until the last ten years. 
This chapter will focus solely on what has taken place with regards to radiological 
security from 2000 to the present. As discussed, early on the U.S. government’s 
preparedness policies for nuclear and radiological incidents was reactive in nature 
and very ad hoc in my last chapter; this chapter will look at the structured Federal 
response and coordination to radiological security incidents as the evolution of the 
U.S. government’s policy of response and coordination. This chapter will also look 
back at events from the early 2000s that had the greatest impact on U.S. policy and 
evolution in U.S. agencies’ planning. Furthermore, an exploration of how our country 
has developed planning guidance, laws, and agency delegation to address the 
threat of radiological security will be discussed. An argument will be made that the 
U.S. (and the rest of the world) has been in an infancy stage when it comes to 
addressing radiological security incidents until the last ten years. This argument will 
be reinforced by explaining the development of more recent and significant laws, 
acts, guidance, and conventions, and will include personal interviews conducted with 
respected subject matter experts in the industry for their perspective and opinion. 
Due to current events taking place with regards to the Covid-19 pandemic, 
interviews scheduled with some top officials in the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) have had to be 
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cancelled as they support both radiological security as well as biological security. I 
will look to reengage these officials following the pandemic to get their perspective 
and update my research. With respect to the various domestic and international 
laws, acts, guidance, and conventions, there are literally hundreds of initial and 
revised versions that have been published in the last 20 years; the intent of this 
chapter is not to capture and parse the words of every single treaty, memorandum, 
etc., or to provide a legal or guidance document with a chronological history of every 
radiological security initiative the world over, but rather paint a picture on how 
radiological security has evolved structurally (particularly within the U.S.) over the 
last 20 years. This will include the transition from the pre-2000 “Silo” or “stovepipe” 
model of agency preparedness to current “whole of government” preparedness 
structure. 
The turn of the century was a turn to terrorism 
In the last chapter, the idea was presented that the pivotal shift in U.S. policy 
involving (nonmilitary) nuclear and radiological incident preparedness didn’t happen 
until the Clinton administration issued PDD 39, which was in response to multiple 
terrorist attacks both domestically and internationally. At the start of the 2000s, U.S. 
agencies and Congress started raising concerns of the threat posed by various 
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs); radiological threats were of specific concern. 
This section will provide additional historical relevance to events and how these 
events impacted the policies and response planning that dictates the U.S.’ 
radiological security posture.   
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A significant component of the U.S.’ current radiological response policy was 
the Clinton administration’s Presidential Decision Directive-62 (PDD-62), or the 
"Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans 
Overseas," on May 22, 1998. PDD-62 cemented PDD-39’s direction that the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will serve as the Lead Federal Agency for "crisis 
management" and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will serve 
as the Lead Federal Agency for "consequence management” during a radiological or 
nuclear event. Furthermore, PDD-62 states that it is increasingly likely that terrorist 
groups, or individuals with criminal intent, may use unconventional methods to 
disrupt the U.S.’ critical infrastructure through the use of WMDs or use WMDs 
against the U.S. population in an attack. The collective opinion was that criminals 
and terrorist groups had both the intent and technical capability (which would be 
proven in the post-2000 world) to use WMDs that included or used radioactive 
material. This led the U.S. to develop a more efficient, structured, and sophisticated 
policies and dictated the preparation, coordination, and response to the threat of 
radiological security incidents. Threats driving policy during this time included 
terrorist groups choosing asymmetrical attacks on the U.S.’ domestic and 
international vulnerabilities through the use of WMD. Another policy driving threat 
was intelligence that indicated terrorist groups possessed the knowledge, skills, and 
abilities to use WMDs.53 
 In January 2001, the U.S. published the Interagency Domestic Terrorism 
Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN), which represented a concerted effort by a 
 
53 The White House.  PDD 62.  May 22, 1998. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd-62.htm 
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number of Federal departments and agencies to work together to achieve a common 
goal. The CONPLAN further defined the six primary departments and agencies with 
responsibilities that were identified in PDD-39. The CONPLAN was designed to 
provide overall guidance to Federal, state, and local agencies a map of how the 
Federal government would respond to a potential or actual domestic terrorist threat, 
particularly one involving WMDs. The CONPLAN outlined, organized, and unified the 
Federal government’s response structure to a terrorist threat or act. In addition, it 
assigned responsibilities based on capabilities for the timely, coordinated response 
by Federal agencies to a terrorist threat or act. It also established guidance for 
assessing and monitoring a developing threat, how to appropriately notify Federal, 
state, and local agencies of the nature of the threat, and how to deploy critical 
advisory and technical resources to assist the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) in 
facilitating interdepartmental coordination of crisis and consequence management 
activities.54 
Other details in the CONPLAN included the mission, capabilities, and 
resources of supporting departments and agencies, and the actions each agency or 
department must perform during each phase of the  U.S.’ response to an incident 
involving the use of WMDs. As a note of clarification, the U.S. government divides 
an incident into two phases (which have been referenced before): crisis 
management and consequence management. Crisis management can be thought of 
as all actions taken to prevent the occurrence of a terrorist attack, and consequence 
 
54 Federation of American Scientists. https://fas.org/irp/threat/conplan.html. January 2001 
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management can be thought of as all actions taken to return the government (at all 
levels) to a proper working state. 55  
The CONPLAN was critical, as it served as the foundation to further develop 
the plans, policies, and procedures of organizations and agencies at the national, 
regional, state, and local level. The CONPLAN provided guidelines for 
communication, response activities, operations, and coordination of public 
information across all levels of government. It also identified the following agencies 
as critical to a coordinated response: 
• Department of Justice (DOJ) / Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as the 
lead agency for crisis management  
• Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as the lead agency for 
Consequence Management 
• Department of Defense (DOD)  
• Department of Energy (DOE) - providing scientific-technical personnel and 
equipment in support of the LFA during all aspects of a nuclear/radiological 
WMD terrorist incident 
• Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)  
• Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)56 
Although this was an excellent step forward in the development of the U.S. 
government’s radiological incident response planning efforts, further refinement of a 
national response plan and additional developments of the U.S. government’s 
interagency coordination and communication mechanisms would take place over the 
next 15 years; the result were more fully developed policies. 
Prior to the development of the CONPLAN, U.S. intelligence agencies and 
Congress shared a growing concern over international terrorist groups carrying out a 





International Terrorism by the National Commission on Terrorism, it stated, “A 
terrorist attack involving a biological agent, deadly chemicals, or nuclear or 
radiological material, even if it succeeds only partially, could profoundly affect the 
entire nation. The government must do more to prepare for such an event.”57 
The growing concern for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 
(CBRN) materials was growing among Federal agencies, in Congress, and in the 
Bush administration. 
In 2001, the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), the international 
organization that promotes the peaceful use of nuclear energy, was also beginning 
to perceive that radiological material in the hands of terrorists posed a significant 
threat to the world. The IAEA’s Secretariat, as the result of the major findings from a 
previous IAEA conference, produced a “Revised Action Plan for the Safety and 
Security of Radiation Sources”, also called the Revised Action Plan. The Revised 
Action Plan was approved by the IAEA’s Board of Governors on September 10, 
2001. The Revised Action Plan called for Member States, which were countries that 
have agreed to comply with the radiological security standards and guidance set 
forth by the IAEA, to implement the IAEA’s newly developed Code of Conduct on the 
Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (which was a non-legally binding legal 
instrument issued by the IAEA). The effectiveness of this Code of Conduct was later 
reviewed at a meeting of technical and legal experts in August 2002 with provisions 
relating to the security of sources needing to be strengthened in light of the events of 
September 11, 2001. A final version of the Code of Conduct was published in 
 
57 National Commission on Terrorism.  Countering the changing threat of International Terrorism. June 2000. 
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January 2004.58 This document, along with several others from the IAEA, serve as 
international guidance for member states to enhance their security, planning, 
response, and coordination policies with respect to radiological security.  
9/11 
On September 11, 2001, a major terrorist attack occurred when nineteen 
terrorists who were members of al-Qaeda, an Islamist extremist network, hijacked 
four commercial airplanes. In a coordinated attack, the hijackers intentionally flew 
two of the planes into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center, and a third into 
the Pentagon. Learning about the other hijackings, passengers and crew members 
on the fourth plane launched a counterattack, spurring the hijacker pilot to crash the 
plane into a field in Pennsylvania. Nearly 3,000 people were killed on that day, the 
single largest loss of life resulting from a foreign attack on American soil.59 For many 
of those interviewed for this chapter that worked in radiological security during this 
time, this incident heightened the gravity that the U.S. placed on the terrorist use of 
WMDs and how to improve security policies, the preparation for terrorist incidents, 
and the response and coordination during a terrorist incident.  
During an interview with the Deputy under Security for the Office of 
Counterterrorism at NNSA, Jay Tilden, he stated:  
“It wasn’t until the 2000s that we started to become more proactive 
with response to radiological security… we needed to have a broader 
approach to law enforcement and civil authorities.  Radiological expertise 
started shifting from the DoD to the Federal agencies prior to 9/11, but a gap 
in experience was starting to be evident in the technical staff at the Federal 
agencies.  NNSA started to partner with DHS, NRC, FEMA and state and 
 
58 International Atomic Energy Agency.  Code of Conduct for the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. 
2004. 
59 9/11 Memorial. https://timeline.911memorial.org/#FrontPage. 
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local agencies to get ahead of it. 9/11 and the formation of DHS started this 
by putting train-the-trainer programs into hyperdrive to prepare against a 
bunch of CBRN threats. Major ports of entry and major targets received 
money to support critical assets.”60  
 
The events of 9/11 spurred the review of many U.S. government 
preparedness policies, including providing the substantial impetus to trigger the 
revision, creation, and development of new response and coordination policies 
involving WMD incidents and terrorism. 
Lessons Learned  
In the years following 9/11, research began to shed light on gaps in the U.S.’ 
Federal coordination and response during a terrorist attack. In the final report from 
the 9/11 Commission, the executive summary stated that the attack came as a, 
“shock, and not as a surprise”. It stated this because it was found that Al Qaeda had 
built the infrastructure and capabilities within its organization to sufficiently plan and 
execute the attack.61  There were several lessons learned and findings in the report. 
Some of these findings had direct impact on how the U.S. government would now 
prepare for radiological security incidents, to include: 
• Imagination - Leaders responsible for action and policy didn’t believe the 
threat was possible. 
• The most serious weaknesses in agency capabilities were in the domestic 
arena. The FBI did not have the capability to link the collective knowledge of 
agents in the field to national priorities. Other domestic agencies deferred to 
the FBI. 
• The U.S. government did not find a way of pooling intelligence and using it to 
guide the planning and assignment of responsibilities for joint operations 
involving entities as disparate as the CIA, the FBI, the State Department, the 
military, and the agencies involved in homeland security. 
 
60 Tilden, Jay.  Personal Interview. March 21, 2020 
61 9/11 Commission. Final Report. Accessed 4/5/20 
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• The civilians, firefighters, police officers, emergency medical technicians, and 
emergency management professionals exhibited steady determination and 
resolve under horrifying, overwhelming conditions on 9/11. 
• Effective decision-making in New York was hampered by problems in 
command and control and in internal communications. 
• Congress and the Executive branch responded slowly to the rise of 
transnational terrorism as a threat to national security. 
• Make homeland security funding contingent on the adoption of an incident 
command system to strengthen teamwork in a crisis, including a regional 
approach. Allocate more radio spectrum and improve connectivity for public 
safety communications and encourage wide-spread adoption of newly 
developed standards for private-sector emergency preparedness—since the 
private sector controls 85 percent of the nation’s critical infrastructure. 
 
These findings were critical to pushing congress and the Bush administration 
to further refine agency coordination and communication. This culminated in the 
development and adoption of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and 
the Incident Command System (ICS), both written because of Presidential directives. 
The 9/11 Commission’s report further identified how local and state agencies had 
not been fully integrated into the national-level coordination and response that was 
necessary to deal with this attack.  
Following 9/11, Al Qaeda and concerns of the terrorist use of WMDs 
continued. In June of 2002, a significant arrest was made that shifted the radiological 
security posture in the U.S. In a statement made by the then Attorney General John 
Ashcroft, he said: 
“I am pleased to announce today a significant step forward in the War 
on Terrorism. We have captured a known terrorist who was exploring a plan 
to build and explode a radiological dispersion device, or "dirty bomb," in the 
United States. I commend the FBI, the CIA, the Defense Department, and the 
other Federal agencies whose cooperation made this possible… While in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, Al Muhajir [born Jose Padilla] trained with the 
enemy, including studying how to wire explosive devices and researching 
radiological dispersion devices. Al Qaeda officials knew that as a citizen of 
the United States, as a citizen of the United States holding a valid U.S. 
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passport, Al Muhajir would be able to travel freely in the U.S. without drawing 
attention to himself.  
The United States government was tracking Abdullah Al Muhajir when, 
on May the 8th, 2002, this year, he flew from Pakistan into Chicago O'Hare 
International Airport, where he was placed in the custody of federal law 
enforcement authorities.  
  In apprehending Al Muhajir as he sought entry into the United States, 
we have disrupted an unfolding terrorist plot to attack the United States by 
exploding a radioactive "dirty bomb." 
Now, a radioactive "dirty bomb" involves exploding a conventional 
bomb that not only kills victims in the immediate vicinity, but also spreads 
radioactive material that is highly toxic to humans and can cause mass death 
and injury.62  
 
In an interview with Michael Haase, the former Division Director in the 
International Office of Material Protection and Cooperation at the Department of 
Energy, additional context was provided and how this incident continued to shift the 
U.S.’ radiological security posture following 9/11. Mr. Haase stated: 
 “Radiological Security started to get on the radar with incidents like the 
Chechen planting of radioactive material in Moscow… terrorists were showing 
an interest in the material.  Prior to Jose Padilla, some security in Russia was 
done with concern over radiological material. After 9/11, it took off.  Jose 
Padilla was the trigger for Congress funding radiological security. Originally 
only international incidents were a concern, but this shifted; it went domestic 
and Padilla showed why it should have been a major concern.  Prior to that it 
hadn’t been perceived to be practical or feasible. So, a task force was created 
in 2003 to break radiological security from nuclear security which involved a 
big IAEA conference with then DOE Secretary Spencer Abraham.”63   
 
 This was further reiterated by Former Chief with the U.S. Nuclear Command 
and Control Systems, Jay Carroll. He provided his perspective from working within 
DoD at the time: 
“Predominately, up to this point, radiological security had been viewed 
in a military context.  9/11 was the point we began to fully engage on all the 
sources, to include radioactive.  For the military, it was the security of nuclear 
weapons.  The big change was reevaluating risk and what that risk tolerance 
 
62 Department of Justice. Al Qaeda “Dirty Bomb” Plot Disrupted. June 2, 2002. 
63 Haase, Michael.  Personal Interview.  April 3, 2020. 
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was. The radiological source issue wasn’t new.  The NRC, DOE, and IAEA 
started to develop guidelines to protect and secure radioactive material out 
there.  There are numerous sources that were out there around the world in 
abandoned hospitals or facilities. All of sudden we thought, what if a terrorist 
group made a dirty bomb? This began the discussion in the military and 
interagency (a group of Federal agencies with responsibilities to secure and 
respond to radiological incidents).  We went to a run after 9/11.  We were 
“high and to the right” for these threats.  We quickly realized the problem was 
a lot bigger than us.  We had to prioritize risks and threats.  We had an intel 
community trying to figure issues of theft.  It [radiological risk] was a safety-
based threat prior to that.  Operationally, we began to ask how do we handle 
this?  DoD’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) looked to help Russia 
at first to protect material, and then all over the map. The other thing we 
started doing was working in various groups doing good work, but they were 
in silos.  DOE and DTRA was also doing good work in the same area but not 
integrated.”64   
 
So, although the U.S. saw the need to address radiological security, the 
infrastructure necessary to support effective cooperation and coordination had not 
been developed. This can be understandable to people in radiological preparedness, 
as it does follow some theories on risk assessment. In those theories, organizations 
identify the most significant risks arising from an on-going basis and:  
• Prioritize risks based on the likelihood of occurrence and potential 
impact. 
 
• Implement strategies to mitigate risks 
• And monitor effectiveness of risk management efforts65. 
Since there was not prior public evidence of radioactive material being a concern, it 
demonstrates why radiological security was relatively new.   
 Among other responses by the U.S., on October 24, 2001, the House passed 
the USA Patriot Act of 2001 which went into law. Of the many sections included in 
 
64 Carroll, Jay. Personal Interview. April 1, 2020. 
65 Georgetown University.  Risk Management Overview.  Accessed April 11, 2020 
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this act that focused on stopping terrorism, several sections included aspects to 
reduce terrorist access to and use of weapons, including radiological materials.   
(Sec. 411) Includes within the definition of "terrorist activity" the use of any 
weapon or dangerous device. 
 
Redefines "engage in terrorist activity" to mean, in an individual capacity or as 
a member of an organization, to: (1) commit or to incite to commit, under 
circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or serious bodily injury, 
a terrorist activity; (2) prepare or plan a terrorist activity; (3) gather information 
on potential targets for terrorist activity; (4) solicit funds or other things of 
value for a terrorist activity or a terrorist organization (with an exception for 
lack of knowledge); (5) solicit any individual to engage in prohibited conduct 
or for terrorist organization membership (with an exception for lack of 
knowledge); or (6) commit an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should 
know, affords material support, including a safe house, transportation, 
communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial benefit, 
false documentation or identification, weapons (including chemical, biological, 
or radiological weapons), explosives, or training for the commission of a 
terrorist activity; to any individual who the actor knows or reasonably should 
know has committed or plans to commit a terrorist activity; or to a terrorist 
organization (with an exception for lack of knowledge).66 
 
The passing of the patriot act provided the government additional means to 
prevent and protect the U.S. through several portions of the Act which allowed 
Investigators to use the tools that were already available to investigate organized 
crime and drug trafficking. Allows law enforcement to use surveillance against more 
crimes of terror including allowing - 
• Federal agents to follow sophisticated terrorists trained to evade detection.  
• Law Enforcement to conduct investigations without tipping off terrorists.  
• Federal agents to ask a court for an order to obtain business records in 




67 Department of Justice. “US Patriot Act of 2001” https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm 
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The Patriot Act also facilitated information sharing and cooperation among 
government agencies so that they can better "connect the dots." The Act removed 
the major legal barriers that prevented the law enforcement, intelligence, and 
national defense communities from talking and coordinating their work to protect the 
American people and our national security.68  
Further, the Patriot Act updated the law to reflect new technologies and new 
threats. The Act brought the law up to date with current technology, so we no longer 
have to fight a digital-age battle with antique weapons-legal authorities leftover from 
the era of rotary telephones. Allows law enforcement officials to obtain a search 
warrant anywhere a terrorist-related activity occurred.  
Finally, the Patriot Act increased the penalties for those who commit terrorist 
crimes. Americans are threatened as much by the terrorist who pays for a bomb as 
by the one who pushes the button. That's why the Patriot Act imposed tough new 
penalties on those who commit and support terrorist operations, both at home and 
abroad. In particular, the Act:  
• Prohibits the harboring of terrorists. The Act created a new offense that 
prohibits knowingly harboring persons who have committed or are about to 
commit a variety of terrorist offenses, such as: destruction of aircraft; use of 
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons; use of weapons of mass 
destruction; bombing of government property; sabotage of nuclear facilities; 




• Enhanced the inadequate maximum penalties for various crimes likely to be 
committed by terrorists: including arson, destruction of energy facilities, 
material support to terrorists and terrorist organizations, and destruction of 
national-defense materials. 
• Enhanced a number of conspiracy penalties, including for arson, killings in 
federal facilities, attacking communications systems, material support to 
terrorists, sabotage of nuclear facilities, and interference with flight crew 
members. Under previous law, many terrorism statutes did not specifically 
prohibit engaging in conspiracies to commit the underlying offenses. In such 
cases, the government could only bring prosecutions under the general 
federal conspiracy provision, which carries a maximum penalty of only five 
years in prison. 
• Punishes terrorist attacks on mass transit systems. 
• Eliminates the statutes of limitations for certain terrorism crimes and 
lengthens them for other terrorist crimes.69  
Homeland Security 
In November 2002, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was 
established under the Homeland Security Act. Under this act, the primary mission 
was to prevent terrorist attacks and reduce the vulnerability of terrorism in the United 
States. Additionally, the act delegated DHS would have responsibility to coordinate 
with state and local government personnel, agencies, and authorities, and with the 




activities. Also, DHS was responsible for coordinating and, as appropriate, 
consolidating, the Federal government’s communications and systems of 
communications relating to homeland security incidents with state and local 
government personnel, agencies, and authorities, the private sector, other entities, 
and the public; and distributing or, as appropriate, coordinating the distribution of 
warnings and information to state and local government personnel, agencies, and 
authorities and to the public.70  The creation of DHS led to many changes in the 
government including shifting several agencies under DHS’ authority, including the 
Coast Guard, FEMA, the Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement, and others. This was a significant shift in coordination 
efforts as the U.S. started to realize that there was a greater need for internal 
cooperation of agencies and acted on that realization.   
Background Guidance and Presidential Directives that Improved Coordination 
in the U.S. 
 
The Homeland Security Act was followed by action from the Bush 
Administration issuing Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5. The 
purpose of this directive was to enhance the ability of the United States to manage 
domestic incidents by establishing a single, comprehensive national incident 
management system. It further detailed that to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and 
recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies, the United 
States Government shall establish a single, comprehensive approach to domestic 
incident management. Furthermore, with regard to domestic incidents, the United 
 
70 Public Law 107-296.  Homeland Security Act.  November 25, 2002 
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States Government were to treat crisis management and consequence management 
as a single, integrated function, rather than as two separate functions and identified 
the Secretary of Homeland Security as is the principal Federal official for domestic 
incident management as delegated in the Homeland Security Act of 2002.71  In a 
study conducted by Richard Falkenrath for the Brooking’s Institute, he summarized 
this reorganization by stating that: 
The U.S. government has initiated major changes in its incident 
management system in the three years since the 9/11 attacks. This new 
system is, in many respects, a work in progress. Many of the changes 
currently underway are not well understood outside the government or even, 
in some cases, within the government.72 
 
HSPD-5 may not have produced all of the desired results with regards to 
coordination of agencies, but it was the major step needed for outlining the structure 
with regards to managing incidents. The Former Chief of CBRN Operations at the 
Department of Homeland Security and Chief of National Policy and Planning at the 
FBI, Victor Valentine Davis, provided additional insight:   
“After 9/11 and Amerithrax [the name given to the investigation of the 
2001 Anthrax attacks], CBRN was something to look at closely.  There started 
to be a more proactive shift made to radiological incidents.  What are we 
doing for security and how are we going to respond?  It is going to have to 
include state and locals.  The “Whole of Government” response wasn’t really 
started until HSPD-5. We always looked at crisis and consequence differently 
because historically they were handled separately.  The Attorney General 
was responsible for Law Enforcement (LE) response and the FEMA 
administrator for consequence.  That bifurcation caused problems because 
they weren’t talking. It was a gap that could be exploited.  We needed to 
ensure crisis and consequence response was treated as a single integrated 
function.  The Secretary of Homeland Security would be the one to ensure all 
the pieces are working together and that crisis and consequence was one 
unit.  HSPD-5 led to the enacting of National Incident Management System.  
 
71 The White House.  Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5. February 28, 2003. 
72 Falkenrath, Richard/The Brookings Institute.  Homeland Security and Consequence Management.  June 1, 
2005. 
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We needed to have one national system where everyone talks together.  
They all have to speak the same language.  Interoperable communications.  
Adding certifications under Incident Command System to qualify individuals 
on competency.”73   
 
As stated before, HSPD-5 may not have fixed everything, but it did transform 
coordination and communication among all levels of government. On March 1, 2004, 
after close collaboration with state and local government officials and 
representatives from a wide range of public safety organizations, Homeland Security 
issued NIMS. It incorporated many existing best practices into a comprehensive 
national approach to domestic incident management, applicable at all jurisdictional 
levels and across all functional disciplines.   
The NIMS represented a core set of doctrine, principles, terminology, and 
organizational processes to enable effective, efficient and collaborative incident 
management at all levels of government (Federal, state, and local). To provide the 
framework for interoperability and compatibility, the NIMS is based on a balance 
between flexibility and standardization. The recommendations of from a dedicated 
commission assigned to investigate the attacks, further highlighted the importance of 
the Incident Command System (ICS). The Commission's report recommended the 
national adoption of the ICS to enhance command, control and communications 
capabilities.74  
NIMS provided a common, nationwide approach to enable the “whole 
community” to work together to manage all threats and hazards. NIMS applied to all 
incidents, regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity. ICS was designed to 
 
73 Valentine Davis, Victor.  Personal Interview.  April 3, 2020 
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enable effective and efficient domestic incident management by integrating a 
combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications 
operating within a common organizational structure.75 
NIMS and ICS were significant policy documents for the U.S., but they still did 
not fully address the complexities of an effective response and coordination to a 
radiological security incident. Addressing this issue, Pamela Piersanti, former 
Supervisory Special Agent and Unit Chief for FBI’s WMD Directorate, provided her 
perspective of the shifts and changes during this time:  
“Most of the strategic work started with nuclear, then cascaded to 
radiological which we ran into in 2003.  We were heavily involved into “silos of 
excellence” [meaning we had great agencies working on issues individually, 
but not across the interagency]. As we looked at roles and responsibilities… 
whether you were DoD, FEMA, or the FBI, we didn’t crosscut. There was a 
belief that each entity had their capability and they would be successful. You 
accepted the word of the other on game day without rehearsal. 
We shifted from that. There were policies that started to be drafted 
such as Bush’s HSPD -5, as it talked to integration.  That named the 
Secretary of Homeland Security as the coordinating role of the response 
actions.  It was the first step in recognizing the problem. It didn’t implement 
anything.  It was for the departments and agencies to figure it out.  There 
wasn’t a push to implement.  It was disjointed and didn’t tie to policy.  It didn’t 
reach down to state and local.  It named them but didn’t include them in 
execution. HSPD-5 set the stage for a lot of things, including conflict at DHS 
Secretary level and at Attorney General level.  It didn’t set a good foundation 
at the state and local level.  It was a good document because it was 
unclassified.  Typically, something like this gets classified; HSPD-5 was left 
unclassified so it could be socialized.”76   
 
What Ms. Piersanti concluded was this was still a new area for the U.S. and 
coordination hadn’t fully been integrated at all levels of government, regardless of 
any directives issued.  
 
75 Ibid 
76 Piersanti, Pamela. Personal Interview. April 1, 2020. 
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 These shortcomings and gaps would be addressed by subsequent policies. 
Following HSPD-5, two other significant and unclassified documents helped pave 
the way towards better coordination: The Bush administration issuing HSPD-8, and 
the Obama administration issuing Presidential Policy Directives. Mr. Valentine-Davis 
provided context on the significance of these two directives.  
“This [HSPD-5] was followed by HSPD - 8 and provided national 
planning scenarios.  The National Preparedness Guidelines’ fifteen National 
Planning Scenarios depict specific high-consequence threats, both natural 
and manmade, around which Federal planning efforts are focused.  These 
scenarios identify particular threats that could result in potentially catastrophic 
effects on our nation and that would require particularly robust coordination 
across all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, private 
sector entities and our international partners.  For those reasons, these 
scenarios form the basis for national planning, training, investment and 
exercises.77  An amendment was made under HSPD – 8, coordinated by the 
Secretary of Homeland Security and putting in motion the development of the 
National Response Framework (NRF).  This document was originally named 
the National Response Plan, it was developed in 2004, revised in 2006, and 
eventually became the NRF in 2008). The annexes of the NRF related to 
incidents and preparedness activities included exercises and training.  These 
exercises and training had to be coordinated.  How does this all fit and go 
together. Coordinating communications, activities, and leadership.”78  
 
HSPD-8 also did two major things. First, it identified steps for improved 
coordination in response to incidents. This directive described the way Federal 
departments and agencies will prepare for such a response, including prevention 
activities during the early stages of a terrorism incident.79  Secondly, it put into 
motion the most critical guidance for all levels of government to date concerning 
planning and coordination. This would all be made clear in the NRF that is later 
 
77 FEMA.  National Response Framework. January 2008. 
78 Valentine Davis, Victor. Interview 
79 The White House. Homeland Security Presidential Policy Directive 8.  Accessed April 4, 2020. 
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discussed. HSPD-8 specifically highlighted the need to develop a national 
preparedness goal with:   
• The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security as the principal 
Federal official for coordinating the implementation of all-hazards 
preparedness in the United States. In cooperation with other Federal 
departments and agencies, the Secretary coordinates the preparedness of 
Federal response assets, and the support for, and assessment of, the 
preparedness of State and local first responders.  
 
• To help ensure the preparedness of the Nation to prevent, respond to, and 
recover from threatened and actual domestic terrorist attacks, major 
disasters, and other emergencies, the DHS Secretary, in coordination with 
the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies and in 
consultation with State and local governments, shall develop a national 
domestic all-hazards preparedness goal. Federal departments and 
agencies will work to achieve this goal by:  
(a) providing for effective, efficient, and timely delivery of Federal 
preparedness assistance to State and local governments; and  
(b) supporting efforts to ensure first responders are prepared to 
respond to major events, especially prevention of and response to 
threatened terrorist attacks.  
• The national preparedness goal will establish measurable readiness 
priorities and targets that appropriately balance the potential threat and 
magnitude of terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies 
with the resources required to prevent, respond to, and recover from them. 
It will also include readiness metrics and elements that support the 
national preparedness goal including standards for preparedness 
assessments and strategies, and a system for assessing the Nation's 
overall preparedness to respond to major events, especially those 
involving acts of terrorism.80 
 
This was a big step for our government to move our country’s response to a more 
proactive state and develop a goal or “end state”. From a security perspective, this 
directive put into words what hadn’t yet been defined. 
 
80 The White House.  Homeland Security Presidential Directive – 8. December 17, 2003. 
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 Cumulatively, the Homeland Security Act, HSPD-5, and HSPD-8, put the U.S. 
government and the interagency on the path towards the development of the NRF 
and the additional coordination that it stipulated. During this time several iterations of 
a national plan were developed, included the Federal Response Plan and National 
Response Plan, but were abandoned as the NRF would supersede them and act as 
the U.S. framework for incident response, including radiological security incidents. 
The NRF remains the current policy guiding the federal government’s response to a 
large-scale incident.  
The National Response Framework (NRF) 
 In January 2008, FEMA released the National Response Framework (NRF) 
as a guide on how the U.S. government and the interagency conducts all-hazards 
response. As illustrated earlier, previous directives or plans lacked a “whole of 
Government” response and typically addressed threats individually. Prior to the 
NRF, the U.S. set guidance for preparing for specific scenarios which then shifted 
under the NRF to “preparing for all-hazards” so agencies could cross-cut 
preparedness activities. The NRF is built upon scalable, flexible, and adaptable 
coordinating structures to align key roles and responsibilities across the nation, 
linking all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private 
sector. It is intended to capture specific authorities and best practices for managing 
incidents that range from the serious but purely local, to large-scale terrorist attacks 
or catastrophic natural disasters.    
The core document, along with the Emergency Support Function Annexes 
and Support Annexes, supersedes the corresponding sections of the National 
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Response Plan (2004, with 2006 revisions) and been developed prior to the FEMA 
release. The Incident Annexes remained in effect until superseded by new guidance, 
several having been updated as recently as 2016.81  
 The NRF provided the U.S. with many guides that are still in use for response 
coordination and further addresses radiological security. The NRF also provided 
more detailed information to assist practitioners in implementing the Framework: 
• Emergency Support Function Annexes grouped Federal resources and 
capabilities into functional areas that are most frequently needed in a 
national response (e.g., Transportation, Firefighting, Mass Care). 
• Support Annexes described essential supporting aspects that are common 
to all incidents (e.g., Financial Management, Volunteer and Donations 
Management, Private-Sector Coordination). 
• Incident Annexes addressed the unique aspects of how we respond to 
seven broad incident categories (e.g., Biological, Nuclear/Radiological, 
Cyber, Mass Evacuation). 
• Partner Guides provided ready references describing key roles and 
actions for local, tribal, State, Federal, and private-sector response 
partners.82 
 
The NRF provided the structure that ultimately tied together the NIMS, ICS, 
and guidance that would organize the overall coordination at all levels of government 
during an incident. This was set in motion in 2008, but it was still missing the 
National preparedness goal that wouldn’t ultimately be adopted until Presidential 
Policy Directive-8 was implemented under the Obama Administration. To provide 
context, the following summary from the Congressional Research Services Report 
for Congress highlights the importance of this document: 
Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness (PPD-8) was signed 
and released by President Barack Obama on March 30, 2011. PPD-8 and its 
component policies intend to guide how the nation, from the Federal level to 
private citizens, can “prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond 
 
81 FEMA.  National Response Framework.  January 2008. 
82 Ibid 
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to, and recover from those threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of 
the Nation.” These threats include terrorist acts, natural disasters, and other 
man-made incidents. PPD-8 evolves from, and supersedes, Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 8, which was released under President George 
W. Bush. PPD-8 is intended to meet many requirements of Subtitle C of the 
Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act of 2006  
 
In addition to the main Directive, an Implementation Plan for PPD-8 and a 
National Preparedness Goal were finalized in 2011. Two National Planning 
Frameworks are also complete, but multiple component PPD-8 policy 
documents are still being developed. Some elements of PPD-8 may not be 
finalized until September 2012 or later. However, PPD-8 has already affected 
national preparedness policy by expanding the scope of the end-state 
objective for preparedness, modifying the capabilities-based planning 
methodology, identifying a new set of national capabilities, and directing the 
creation of more National Planning Frameworks. It is anticipated that the five 
National Planning Frameworks—one each for prevention, protection, 
mitigation, response, and recovery—will assign federal roles and 
responsibilities in each mission area. The National Planning Frameworks are 
also to guide how nonfederal resources are leveraged, including non-profit 
and private sectors’ resources.   
 
 With Regards to PPD-8, the White House also provided this statement: 
As part of the implementation of Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8), we 
are pleased to announce the release of the first-ever National Preparedness 
Goal. To summarize, the goal is:  
To have a secure and resilient Nation with the capabilities required across the 
whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and 
recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk.  
The Goal identifies the core capabilities and capability targets necessary to 
advance our national preparedness.  It builds extensively on the prior work of 
many stakeholder groups from around the nation, draws upon lessons 
learned from large-scale and catastrophic events, and represents input from 
all stakeholders.  
It also recognizes what many of you have known for some time – as we work 
to build a more prepared nation, we cannot only look at the role that 
government plays, we must also work with the entire community – both the 
public and private sectors, faith-based and non-profit organizations, and most 
importantly the public.  
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Now that the National Preparedness Goal is complete, we will continue our 
work on the additional requirements of PPD-8: 
• A National Preparedness System Description; 
• A series of National Frameworks and Federal Interagency Operational 
Plans’ 
• A National Preparedness Report; and 
• A Campaign to Build and Sustain Preparedness 83 
How PPD-8 impacted those at the practitioner or operational level, Mr. Valentine 
Davis commented:  
“Under PPD-8, National response framework got broken up into five 
frameworks – Prevention, Protection, Response, Mitigation, and Recovery.  
Basically, this led to the Federal Interagency Operational Plans (FIOPs). This 
essentially said, let’s talk as a Federal government with regard to what we are 
doing as activities. This complicated things because it was separated the five 
separate plans. When does one plan end and the other one start? It has a lot 
to do with funding and scope. So, from a radiological security perspective, we 
entered a heightened alert around the time Obama got elected.  I was in DHS 
at the time.  What if there was really a threat, what would you really need? 
So, there in 2008-2009, a lot of agencies were protecting their lanes and 
budgets.   
In 2009-2010, the Federal agencies really started syncing and working 
on how are we actually going to coordinate a response? We did 3 or 4 
exercises in crisis action teams, Joint Nuclear Response Team (NRT). It was 
the same people doing the all of the exercises… not much training for a larger 
audience and state and locals. Interagency Incident Management Group 
(IIMG).  All National Guard, FBI, CIA, NSA, DHS, CBP, Coast Guard, DIA, 
DOE, NNSA to practice radiological security on if something happens… this 
was held at the National Operations Center.  How many times do you have a 
terrorist incident like 9/11? This never actually gets used.  FEMA, NRC was 
important to DHS then focusing on man-mand crisis response at the national 
level.  This eventually got disbanded and left a big gap.”84   
 
Mr. Valentine Davis discussed how important the interagency was to help 
improve the cooperation and coordination among the principal agencies. With 
 
83 The White House. PPD-8: Announcing the National Preparedness Goal.  October 7, 2011  
 
84 Valentine Davis, Victor. Interview. 
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regards to radiological security, Interagency groups meeting to address the 
response and coordination was a big development. He contended that the IIMG left 
a big gap, but that the interagency eventually revitalized its efforts and started 
multiple other cooperative mechanisms in the last 10 years that are still currently 
used. 
During the period between 2000 and 2010, an explosion of policies, plans, 
and guidance had been developed, updated, and implemented to support the 
coordination of a response and delegate roles during a national level incident.  
These policies also had a tremendous impact in how the U.S would respond to a 
radiological security incident. Numerous other relevant documents not mentioned in 
this chapter include national strategies, guidance documents such as FEMA’s 
Managing the Emergency Consequences of Terrorist Incidents, operational plans 
and countless others along with their revised versions to support a better radiological 
security culture and coordination in the U.S. 
Agencies Supporting Radiological Security 
 In order to better explain the complexities inherent in an effective radiological 
response, it is necessary to provide information on the predominate agencies 
involved with radiological security and incidents. As stated before, the prioritization 
of responding to a radiological incident, be it accidental or intentional, has changed 
throughout the years. The Jose Padilla case made an attack using radiological 
material a real world, rather than conceptual, threat. From a 2003 article published in 
the National Institutes of Health: 
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A radiological terrorist attack on the United States is a possibility. This 
could involve the dispersal of radioactive material by an attack on a nuclear 
facility, deployment of a radiation dispersal device, or, less likely, detonation of 
a nuclear weapon. To decrease our vulnerability to this type of threat, the 
medical community should have a basic understanding of radiation hazards 
and their medical management, and it should be prepared to interact with 
appropriate federal agencies to facilitate the employment of emergency 
response plans.85 
 
The changing perception of how a radiological attack would impact a major city is 
illustrated by the following quote from the Deputy Commissioner of the New York 
Police Department: 
 
“What would have been the impact if the improvised explosive devices 
detonated at the finish line of the Boston Marathon on April 15, 2013 would 
have contained radiological material?  The fallout from a radiological dirty 
bomb event could demand a much larger recovery than a conventional strike.  
An attack in a dense urban area such as Boston or New York City would 
cause contamination to a large area around the site of the explosion.  The 
impacted area would have to be evacuated… while environmental 
remediation is carried out.  There could also be deep psychological scarring 
from the event.  There would be mass panic…a potential death knell for a 
major urban area.”86 
 
From the 2017 National Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: 
Domestically, we must empower our frontline defenders—our state and local 
law enforcement professionals—as well as many other government, civil 
society, and private sector partners to prevent and counter terrorism in the 
United States.” 
“We will bolster efforts to detect nuclear, chemical, radiological, and biological 
agents and keep them from being used against us. We will also better 
integrate intelligence, law enforcement, and emergency management 
operations to ensure that frontline defenders have the right information and 
capabilities to respond to WMD threats from state and non-state actors.” 
 
“For materials that remain necessary for commercial, medical, or research 
purposes, we will assist in improving our partners’ capacity to guard against 
both external and insider threats—in storage, in use, and in transit.”87  
 
 
85 National Institutes of Health. Radiological Terrorism. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12854429. 
June 2003 
86 Nuclear Threat Institute. https://www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-officials-warn-dirty-bomb-danger-aftermath-
boston-bombing/. April 25, 2013. 
87 The White House.  National Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.  December 1, 2018. 
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These are just a handful of the sentiments that show both the increased 
concern that radioactive material could be used in a terrorist attack and the growing 
prioritization to prepare for this kind of incident. There are three agencies that have a 
significant role in securing and protecting radioactive material, and if necessary, 
responding to a deliberate or accidental radiological incident. 
NNSA, FBI, and DHS 
The first of the three agencies to be discussed is the National Nuclear 
Security Administration (NNSA), which is a semi-autonomous organization within the 
U.S. Department of Energy responsible for a wide range of missions within the 
nuclear and radiological world. Within the NNSA, multiple sub-offices and 
departments exist each with specific goals and missions as it relates to nuclear and 
radiological issues. One such department is the Office of Radiological Security 
(ORS), formerly known as the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) 
ORS (then GTRI) had been tasked with the “protection” mission by NNSA, 
making it a leading agency ensuring high-activity radioactive materials were kept out 
of the hands of terrorists or other non-regulatory actors. The protect mission was 
one of the key concerns raised by Congress and multiple Presidential 
administrations. Former Director of North and South America with GTRI, Ioanna 
Iliopulis, provided her recollections of the start of the GTRI program:  
“The whole conversation of radiological source security started in 2000.  
There were discussions on non-voluntary programs for radioactive sources.  It 
started with the IAEA’s Code of Conduct.  In the 90s, safety was the concern. 
Radioactive sources weren’t looked at as being maliciously used for an economic 
or psychological tool by terrorists. That was born after 9/11 and beyond.  GTRI 
didn’t get funded for these programs to start. We started looking at radioactive 
materials after the Jose Padilla arrest. Congress started getting more concerned.  
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They were concerned for all classes of WMDs. At the time, the U.S. government 
wasn’t organized to address radiological terrorism.  It was little bit focused to 
radiological threats, but mainly in small pieces or under nuclear.  In 2003-2004, 
NNSA’s percentage of total funding was .2% that was dedicated for radiological 
security.  This was considered a lower consequence incident. The focus was 
really to give us more money to start these programs.  It started with Russian 
support and international programs.  Domestic programs didn’t start in 2008-
2009.  So, we went back to countries with nuclear material and looked at if they 
had radiological material.  The DOE National Labs were less interested at the 
time.  Those in the field looked at supporting radiological security as a step down 
from supporting nuclear security. Now we put a security lens on something we 
originally looked at as a material safety issue.88  
Again, this makes sense why security for radioactive material hadn’t been 
addressed until the arrest of Jose Padilla and 9/11. Providing additional background 
on the early days of GTRI was Joe Schwartzel, a former Navy SEAL and current 
response consultant to ORS:  
“I started in 2002 working with NNSA. At the time, there wasn’t much 
domestic work. It was the Materials, Controls, Protections, and Accounting 
(MCPA) program, and we were working with former Russian states.  All Nuclear.  
After 9/11, Congress wanted to know about radioactive material, and 
Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs). At the start, it was all physical protection.  
First economic impact studies were done in ‘04 or ‘05 by Sandia National Lab 
and was classified at first. They did a city simulation with 2000 curies of cesium-
137, detonated an RDD in downtown Manhattan, used explosions as tests in the 
simulation… how far does it spread and what was the economic impact, using 
the existing Protective Action Guidelines by EPA and how does that affect people 
and business?  We used this for arguing for budgets and installing physical 
security. This was then used as information with congress for budget.  In 2008, 
we started a domestic process.  There were Senate and House questions, why 
aren’t we doing this here in the US, but were doing it overseas?  There were 
NRC guidelines in 2005 came out with “Increased controls”.  They started with 
the biggest first, nuclear reactors, then used IAEA 16 isotopes of concern.  The 
Code of Conduct provided other guidance on radioactive material.  Pacific 
Northwest National Labs and Sandia National Laboratories started supporting 
sites across the country.  In 2008, we got involved with the WMD 
counterterrorism exercise program to help secure U.S. sites with radiological 
sources and material.”89   
 
 
88 Iliopulis, Ioanna.  Personal Interview.  April 2, 2020. 
89 Schwartzel, Joseph.  Personal Interview. April 2, 2020 
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ORS has supported radiological security measures for over 18 years. ORS 
prioritizes its activities by focusing on three pillars: Protect, Remove, and Reduce. 
The Protect Pillar involves protecting sites with high-activity radioactive material by 
hardening rooms that house material (enhanced access controls to areas with 
radioactive material, installing state of the art security and surveillance systems in 
these areas, upgrading the physical shielding around the machines that have 
radioactive material inside them, and other steps), conducting training and exercises 
at all levels of government (these training range from the tactical to the policy level), 
and ensuring that sites, agencies, and cities have in place effective response 
policies. On the Remove Pillar, they assist organizations and governments with the 
safe and organized removal of unused or unnecessary radioactive material across 
the world. Lastly, on the Reduce Pillar, they assist participating organizations with 
the transition to from radioactive materials to alternate non-isotopic (material that 
does not have the same health effects as radioactive material) technology (when 
feasible) in an effort to eliminate the threat entirely.90  
To support ORS, NNSA employs contractors (non-Federal employees with 
expertise in specialized areas who work for private companies that are contracted to 
provide services to the government) as well as the Department of Energy’s National 
Labs (the labs, which are geographically dispersed across the U.S., were born out of 
the early efforts to build the atomic bomb during World War II and have since 
evolved to support a variety of missions within NNSA’s portfolio). Matt Thompson, 
 
90 Office of Radiological Security. https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/office-radiological-security-ors. Accessed 
04/10/20. 
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who leads a variety of initiatives under the Protect Pillar, belongs to the latter group, 
and has supported ORS for over 10 years through Sandia National Labs (SNL), 
located in Albuquerque, New Mexico:  
“I came into response integration partly in support to the National Labs being 
involved. They come at it in a scientific facet such as new sensors, platforms, etc.  
DOE had the National Labs take the lead on radiological security.  Now… these 
are science and technology labs. You can’t always deal or handle a security 
problem through technology.  The way it truly needs to be handled is with 
detection, delay, and response… three pillars of a physical protections system, or 
PPS. 
SNL was providing cameras, widgets, fiber optics… they can apply science to 
that aspect.  For delay, we slow the advisory down to allow a law enforcement 
response to arrive at a site.  How long will it take bad guys to cut through a fence 
and leave? Lots of opportunity for science and technology. For response, it is a 
human problem, huge physical and psychological problem.  How fast can we get 
to this problem with the focus on getting to the situation with a fight?  We don’t 
teach them how to shoot, we try to throw science and tech at the response 
problem.  That had been a problem for over the last 15 years.  Another piece of 
this problem is that you can’t establish probabilities of human performance.  
When I was brought in, I was supporting physical security with DOE’s Office of 
Secure Transportation.  When I transitioned to SNL, I supported scientists and 
engineers that were creating the physical protection and helped engage on the 
response. We realized we needed to improve this.  Now let’s look at integrating 
response better.  In the last five years, we’ve done a much better job.  We started 
the domestic 2020 cities initiative with ORS.  We reach out to police 
departments, provide them with training courses, provided equipment, roll call 
videos, training aids, not just a two-day workshop.  Unscripted roll of support to 
be adaptable and be creative with customized solutions.”91   
Mr. Thompson continued to illustrate how radiological security in areas like 
response at the local level has evolved substantially over the last 15 years. Planning 
documents were written, security enhancements were developed, coordination 
designations were made, and even an interagency that had formerly been 
 
91 Thompson, Matt.  Personal Interview.  April 3, 2020 
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notoriously stove piped has continued to improve and embrace information sharing 
as a way to increase radiological security since 2000.  
Internationally, policies and plans have also adapted to address the threat 
posed by radioactive material, which includes placing a priority on developing 
efficient response procedures. High Income countries are better suited to prepare 
and deal with radiological security incidents, but it remains a complex problem. To 
provide how other high-income countries fare in this area, John Buchanan, the 
Radiological Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Unit Coordinator at INTERPOL in 
Europe, provided his perspective: 
 “In the UK, from a Law Enforcement (LE) perspective, I started in 1982, big 
focus on nuclear disarmament, in terms of response of country.  Nobody knew 
anything about the fixed sites, nuclear facilities.  Nobody had an awareness on 
radiological fundamentals, what sources were in hospitals, at universities.  As a 
patrol officer, if something happened, you had no warning or guidance if there 
was a radiological response.  It was an ad hoc approach.  In 2001, 9/11 was the 
changing point in the world.  Even then in the UK, there was need for radiological 
specialists in intelligence.  It wasn’t available to first responders.  CBRN wasn’t a 
focus until 2009-2010, the we started with LE training on CBRN, physical security 
and terrorist attacks.  The Federal government would then go and look at 
vulnerability and response plans.  They would still mark these documents as 
secret which didn’t allow for great coordination and integration.  Still an issue in 
the UK because the greater response community wasn’t trained to deal with 
radiological security.  This changed in 2011, with the move to declassify that 
information to confidential, which meant it could be passed on to LE 
departments.   
From a country perspective, the only thing you could be at that time was 
reactive and not proactive.  You’d be reacting to a potential radiological security 
incident but knew nothing about what you were responding to.  You would have 
to go to the site and then reach back out to technical reach back.  Now sites have 
plans available to provide responders.  Now there is a preventative side.”92  
 
92 Buchanan, John.  Personal Interview.  March 30, 2020. 
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Mr. Buchanan’s thoughts have been echoed by many agencies in the U.S. as 
well as in other countries around the world. Countries without the same funding 
levels dedicated to radiological security such as the U.S. and the U.K. are even 
further behind the curve when it comes to radiological security. The U.S., and 
specifically ORS as well as many other U.S. agencies, has taken a proactive role to 
support this cause. These agencies have been helping countries develop security 
plans, distribute these plans, provide technical training, and improve the radiological 
security culture.  
The FBI is the second agency of significance within the U.S. government’s 
radiological incident structure. The FBI is the lead Federal response agency 
involving a radiological security incident with regards to the Law Enforcement and 
Investigation mission. Recognizing the need to elevate WMD matters with a focus on 
a more cohesive and coordinated approach, the FBI’s Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Directorate (WMDD) was formed in 2005 by then Director Robert S. Mueller. The 
mission of the WMDD is to ensure the FBI and its partners are prepared to 
anticipate, mitigate, disrupt, or respond to WMD threats. With the continued 
evolution of the WMD threat and the possibility of an overseas origin or nexus to 
terrorism, the WMDD advances WMD prevention activities by supporting 
international WMD capacity building, developing plans and policies at strategic and 
operational levels, and developing partnerships, training, and outreach endeavors. 
WMDD has three sections of note: 
• Countermeasures: The WMDD conducts prevention and outreach activities 
through FBI agents who serve as WMD coordinators in each of the FBI’s 56 
field offices across the U.S. Through these representatives, the Directorate 
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heightens awareness of WMD threats, develops liaison relationships to 
mitigate these threats, and uses those relationships to identify evolving WMD 
threats. These liaison relationships are particularly critical in keeping the FBI 
abreast of new WMD threats and potential security vulnerabilities associated 
with technological advances. Tripwires are one example of a specialized, 
coordinated type of outreach where the FBI develops a network of experts—
in law enforcement, public health, and industry, for instance—to assist if a 
threat emerges. 
• Investigations and Operations: The WMDD investigates violations of WMD-
related statutes and is responsible for coordinating, planning, training, and 
leading the FBI’s response to the use or threatened use of WMD threats and 
incidents as a means of terrorism. The Investigations and Operations Section 
(IOS) within the WMDD is composed of six units that provide strategic 
management and oversight of the FBI's WMD program. The IOS is also 
responsible for operational response planning and coordination in support of 
field investigations and the mitigation of WMD threats and incidents. The IOS 
fields three regional WMD assistant legal attachés who address WMD and 
counterproliferation situations by providing training at host government’s 
request and ensuring a timely response for assistance to legal attachés and 
WMD events if pertinent. 
• Intelligence: The WMDD is staffed with a cadre of analysts who develop 
relevant, timely, actionable intelligence to identify, understand, and articulate 
WMD threats and vulnerabilities. The Directorate’s intelligence analysts 
provide WMD subject-matter expertise and apply it to advise investigations 
and the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) regarding international and 
domestic terrorism, criminal/lone actors, critical infrastructure, and 
counterproliferation. WMDD analysts are involved in all aspects of the WMDD 
mission by providing strategic, domain, collection, and tactical analysis to 
WMD investigations and responses to WMD critical incidents.93 
The FBI’s WMDD has provided a significant role in improving radiological 
security and response over the last 15 years. For perspective, former Unit Chief and 
Supervisory Special Agent at the FBI, Ms. Piersanti, shared this:  
“Then in 2006, FBI set up the WMDD. This helped the interagency because it 
had a dedicated force to reach out to DOE and DoD regarding radioactive 
materials… the full gambit at NNSA.  We also started work with DTRA on 
homeland defense (anything domestic) and nuclear matters.  In 2007, we started 
recognizing the need for integration in planning.  We had to have a plan for 
implementation with interagency as well as state and local.  I joined WMDD in 
2007 and recognized these silos in planning and coordination.  We had a TTX 
 
93 Federal Bureau of Investigation.  Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate marks 10 years.  July 25, 2016. 
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series which we used that to gain awareness on the need for integrated plans at 
the senior level. There was reluctance to voice that was a gap in these plans.  
 
Next phase was integrated planning that could bring everyone together in a 
unified command structure to be at the ready for these threats.  We were able to 
bring in state and local, give them security clearances, and have them prepare 
with the federal level. It had to move into the PPD-8 construct. PPD-8 brought 
everyone together. NRF was formed from that.  The WMDD was a driving force 
for building a radiological security culture.  The bureau was standing up WMD 
coordinators. The WMD coordinators respond to all things WMDs. They had 
assistants too that were strategically placed.  They were trained across the U.S. 
They were being heavily trained at the Remote Sensing Lab at the Nevada 
National Security Site for technical detection.  So, a lot of the material was 
vulnerable across the U.S. A lot of issues that come into play. We started looking 
at potential targets such as radioactive material at sites and during transportation 
as well as potential targets for use. We would use trip wires, detection platforms, 
and countermeasures, plans and responses.  WMDD put a programmatic effort 
at looking at acquisition sites and how to stop the threat in 2006.  Then we 
looked at target sites. 
Eventually, we developed a common operating picture at a national level.  We 
became more sophisticated with planning.  We had frameworks for state and 
local agencies.  Prevention, Protection, and Response.  All of the annexes were 
developed around these ideas. The Nuclear and radiological incident annex, for 
instance.  Emergency Support Functions, where you can surge response to a 
certain event. Then, more sophisticated integration with FEMA for both threat 
and consequence.  We recognized we had silos.  Building an integrated line of 
effort that brought in the interagency.  Multiple lines of effort being added.  Intel 
and counterterrorism.  Strategic level being integrated. The key is planning.  
Policy helps, but integrated planning is critical. TTXs are a tool and a means to 
get to a plan.  To actually secure radioactive material, I think the ORS model is 
good.  Protect, Remove, Reduce.  I think it is spot on. If the threat is not 
necessary, think of all of the agencies that have to try to protect it or respond to 
it.  The less of these materials you have, the less burden exists.”94   
Ms. Piersanti provides a prospective of how U.S. agencies like the FBI and ORS are 
developing and implementing plans and strategies that are proactive and looking to 
get ahead of the radiological security problem. 
 
94 Piersanti, Pamela.  Interview. 
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The final agency that plays a significant role in the U.S. government’s 
response and preparedness architecture is the DHS’s Countering Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (CWMD) Office, formerly the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 
(DNDO). This title change and reorganization was done in order to bring additional 
WMD material under the office’s purview (biological and chemical threats, for 
instance). DNDO was significant with developing and aiding radiological security 
policy. DNDO was the primary entity in the U.S. government for implementing 
nuclear detection efforts during a coordinated response to radiological and nuclear 
threats, as well as integrating Federal nuclear forensics programs.95 
DNDO was formed in 2005 and focused on increasing detection capabilities 
in physically vulnerable areas as part of a comprehensive strategy to protect against 
domestic radiological and nuclear threats; for instance, at ports of entry, between 
ports of entry, on small maritime vessels, in the general aviation sector, and the 
domestic interior. DNDO was a jointly staffed, national office organized under the 
DHS comprised of detailees and liaisons from: 
• Department of Energy 
• Department of Defense 
• Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation 
• Department of State 
• Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
DNDO also works with and has detailees from other DHS components such as 
the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, Transportation Security 
Administration, and state and local entities. Additionally, DNDO was charged with 
coordinating the development of the global nuclear detection and reporting 
 
95 Department of Homeland Security.  Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. June 18, 2016 
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architecture, with partners from Federal, state, local, international governments, and 
the private sector.96 
Some of the Directorates within DNDO included support such as: 
 
• Providing national-level stewardship, centralized planning and integration 
for an enduring national technical nuclear forensics capability. 
• Determines gaps and vulnerabilities in the existing global nuclear 
detection architecture, then formulates recommendations and plans to 
develop an enhanced architecture. 
• Carrying out the engineering development, production, developmental 
logistics, procurement and deployment of current and next-generation 
nuclear detection systems. 
• Conducting, supporting, coordinating, and encourages an aggressive, 
long-term research and development program to address significant 
architectural and technical challenges unresolved by R&D efforts on the 
near horizon. 
• Developing the information sharing and analytical tools necessary to 
create a fully integrated operating environment.  
• Ensuring that DNDO proposes sound technical solutions and thoroughly 
understands systems performance and potential vulnerabilities prior to 
deploying those technologies. 
• Independently assessing the operational performance of planned and 
deployed capabilities, including technologies, procedures, and protocols.97 
DNDO’s role in domestic response and preparedness has been significant to 
the country and specifically state and local government agencies. One program that 
specifically addresses radiological security has been the Securing the Cities (STC) 
effort to protect the Nation against the malicious use of nuclear and other radioactive 
materials. It seeks to reduce the risk of a successful deployment of a radiological or 
nuclear weapon against major metropolitan areas in the United States. The program 
 
96 Ibid 
97 CBRNE Central. Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. Accessed April 11, 2020. 
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assists state and local partner agencies as they build regional capabilities to detect, 
analyze, and report nuclear and other radioactive materials. 98 
 DHS has continued to evolve its policies regarding preparedness, response, 
and coordination to radiological security along with other agencies within the U.S. 
Government. Changing DNDO to CWMD and incorporating lessons learned across 
the chemical, biological, and radiological/nuclear spectrums is one example of this 
evolution. Implementing radiological security efforts is not just a DHS responsibility, 
it is shared across all agencies and levels of government and private industry that 
license, use, and respond to radioactive material.  
This chapter contends that the U.S.’ current radiological security strategy was 
born in the early 2000s. This strategy hit rapid growth through the 2010s and has 
matured in the last 5 years with all aspects of planning, coordination, and response 
working together in a collective system.  
 It has taken the better part the last 20 years to build a security culture around 
radioactive material. The U.S. and most countries around the world are still in an 
infancy stage with regards to radiological security relative to many other fields, so, 
the U.S. has and will continue to face struggles with improving planning, 
coordination, response, and security around radioactive materials. DHS, NNSA, and 
the FBI (as well as countless others) have provided a significant transition for our 
country in becoming more proactive and better preparing the U.S. for a potential 
terrorism incident involving radioactive materials. 
 
98 Department of Homeland Security. Securing the Cities Program. September 14, 2015. 
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Over the last 20 years, agencies have been formed and have built up 
guidance and planning documents to better prepare all levels of government for 
radiological security events. The improved coordination of command, control and 
integration is evident through improved interagency collaboration, revisions to key 
U.S. guidance documents, and the practicing of a response involving a radiological 
incident among key agencies at all levels of government.  
To actually work through radiological security plans and test them, the U.S. 
uses a variety of exercise programs. For NNSA and the FBI, WMD counterterrorism 
exercise programs that focus on site or mobile radiological security issues advance 
the awareness, coordination, and planning to radiological security incidents 
necessary between the Federal, state, and local levels of government.  
At a national level, the National Exercise Program (NEP) is mandated by 
Congress to test and strengthen Federal, state and local government ability to 
respond to potential catastrophic events. The NEP is a two-year cycle of exercises 
across the nation that examine and validate capabilities in all preparedness mission 
areas. Each NEP cycle is guided by Principals’ Strategic Priorities, established by 
the Principals Committee of the National Security Council and informed by 
preparedness data from jurisdictions across the nation. FEMA's National Exercise 
Division administers the NEP on behalf of the Federal government, facilitating the 
design, coordination, conduct, evaluation and analysis of NEP exercises.99 The NEP 
has a 17-year history, in which it started under a program referred to as the 
TOPOFF Operations. TOPOFF, which was short for “Top Officials”, had Governors, 
 
99 FEMA. National Exercise Program. 02/10/20 
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mayors, city managers, top Federal and state officials, and others play active roles in 
a simulated emergency event. It was sponsored by the US Department of Homeland 
Security Office for State and Local Government Coordination and designed to 
involve all levels of government as well as emergency service responders including 
police, fire, public health workers and others. States volunteered to participate in 
TOPOFF; two were chosen for each cycle.   
TOPOFF transitioned to National Level Exercises in 2009 when FEMA 
announced that TOPOFF exercises will continue under a new name, Tier 1 National 
Level Exercise (NLE). These were conducted annually in accordance with 
the National Exercise Program (NEP). The exercises were designed to provide all 
levels of government an opportunity to prepare for crises ranging from terrorism to 
natural disasters. In 2012, the National Level Exercise (NLE) changes its name to 
the Capstone Exercise. Finally, in January 2017, the name was changed to the 
National Exercise Program. 
Transition to better radiological security 
 The questions still lingers; how do we further improve our radiological security 
posture in the U.S.?  We’ve come a long way in 20 years. To quote Mr. Glick on how 
far we have come as a country, he states: 
 “When the government moved from ad hoc planning to a more holistic 
and comprehensive planning approach to critical incidents, it greatly improved 
its ability to prepare for and respond to such incidents.  When the USG further 
developed a more strategic approach to preparedness, one which 
emphasized “whole of government” thinking, not only horizontally across the 
federal government, but from a vertical perspective as well, that looked at the 
integration of federal, state, local, tribal and territorial authorities and 
resources, this further enhanced the USG’s ability to respond to critical 
incidents.  I’ve personally seen this evolution from the Clinton and Bush 
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Administrations through the Obama and Trump Administrations.  The most 
recent example is the change within DHS that sought to combine all WMD-
related support efforts in one centralized organizational structure.  When the 
Congress approved the movement of DNDO authorities to a new C-WMD 
Office, it created a new opportunity for DHS to develop expertise across the 
entire CBRN spectrum.  While there is always room for further growth and 
improvement across the USG, in my view, and looking back on the last 20 
years, the federal government has absolutely improved its ability to prepare 
and respond to radiological and other WMD-related incidents.”100 
 
  Now that we have the framework, infrastructure, coordination, and tools finally 
in place, how do we better protect the U.S. from these incidents. I submit that 
exercising plans and coordination is the most effective way to test a plan or policy 
and identify gaps before a real-world incident exposes them for us. However, to 
ensure that these exercises are objectively successful investments, we still need to 
determine if said exercises are actually effective and not just taking place for the 
sake of checking a box. The next chapter will examine how exercise programs and 
their planners can better support U.S. Federal agencies with exercises that produce 






















Tabletop exercises: Are they effective? 
 
[Note to Reader: As noted earlier, this chapter was written, accepted for 
submission, and graded at the end of 2012. The innovative rubric that is discussed 
in this chapter has even more relevance today than when it was written, particularly 
in light of the response to the Coronavirus and recent news reports that have 
discussed the effectiveness of tabletop exercises that were conducted in January 
2017 during the transition between the Obama and Trump Administration. As a 
result, following the submission of this thesis, I intend to consult with additional 
experts and further refine this rubric to support the company I run and the broader 
exercise community.] 
 
Conducting exercises to test preparedness is by no means a revolutionary.  
Exercises and simulations have been utilized to prepare for a variety of dating well 
beyond the last two centuries. This chapter will highlight some of the various forms 
of exercises and training used to prepare for disasters and specifically look at 
whether tabletop exercises are an effective form in preparing organizations for a 
disaster. Lastly, this chapter will discuss the various forms of evaluation and suggest 
a new method of evaluation.    
Over the last 40 years, the United States has endured multiple large-scale 
disasters to include natural disasters like Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina to terrorist 
attacks that include the Oklahoma City Murrah Building bombing and the 9/11 
attacks on World Trade Center and the Pentagon; and embassy bombings in the 
80s and 90s. These disasters resulted in large number of casualties, significant cost 
to public and private entities, and a lot of scrutiny on how government agencies 
respond to these disasters. Keeping this in mind, ensuring exercises, including 
tabletop exercises, are effective should be a priority for the exercise planners and 
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organizations to not only be prepared for a disaster, but to also ensure monies spent 
by the governments or organizations are spent wisely. 
This chapter will again provide some background on how the U.S. 
Government altered policies and laws based on significant events and how they 
relate to the evolution of exercises. Additionally, this chapter highlights methods 
used in determining effectiveness for tabletop exercises that include qualitative 
assessments and introduce some quantitative assessments such as devising a 
rubric and some alternate suggestions. To begin though, the various types of 
training utilized to prepare for disasters will be introduced and with tabletop 
exercises being the primary point of discussion.  
Types of Exercises and Training 
As seen in human-caused events such as the 9/11 attacks, the Virginia Tech, 
Columbine, and Aurora, CO. shootings, as well as natural events such as 
“Snowmageddon,” the name used to describe the various blizzards impacting parts 
of the world in the last four years, hurricanes, and earthquakes, response assets are 
tasked with handling the crisis and consequence results. To prepare for numerous 
scenarios, response assets take part in all forms of training that range from 
Discussion-Based to Operations-Based exercises which include the actual 
deployment of resources.101  Each form of training exercise has unique goals and 
characteristics of conduct.102  Below, table 1 describes discussion-based exercises 
and table 2 describes operations-based exercises. 
 




Table 1: Discussion-Based Exercises 
Type                              Goals & Characteristics 





More formal than a seminar and is used to build or achieve a 
product.  Typically includes more participant discussion and often 
uses breakout sessions.104 
Tabletop 
Exercise 
An informal group discussion for senior staff, appointed officials or 
other key personnel to work through realistic hypothetical scenarios.  
Goals include identifying gaps and looking to walking through 
situations and try out new concepts.  Some characteristics include 
an in-depth discussion that can be observed by an audience or 
observers and requires an experienced facilitator.105 
 
Games An exploration of the processes and consequences of decision-
making using “what-if” analyses to test existing or potential 
strategies. Often involves two or more teams but does not involve 
the use of actual resources.106  
 
Table 1: Discussion-Based Exercises 
Table 2: Operations-Based Exercises 
Type                              Goals & Characteristics 
Drills A supervised activity that tests a specific operation or function of a 
single agency to gain training on new equipment, new procedure, 
practice or maintain skills, or preparation.  Drills are normally 




A single or multi-agency activity designed to evaluate capabilities 
and multiple functions in a highly stressful environment using 
simulated response to assess the adequacy of response plans and 




A high-stress multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional activity involving 








scripted realistic exercise scenario.  The goal of the exercise is to 
assess and evaluate plans, procedures and response under crisis 
conditions.108 
 
Table 2: Operations-Based Exercises 
 Exercises play a vital role in preparedness by enabling stakeholders to test 
and validate plans and capabilities and identify both capability gaps and areas for 
improvement. A well-designed exercise provides a low-risk environment to test 
capabilities, familiarize personnel with roles and responsibilities, and foster 
meaningful interaction and across organizations.109 Exercises bring together and 
strengthen the responders in their efforts to prevent, protect/deter, mitigate, respond 
to, and recover from all hazards. Overall, exercises are cost-effective and useful 
tools that help the nation or an organization practice and refine our collective 
capacity to achieve the core capabilities preparedness goals.110 
Because most of the expertise utilized in the contribution to this paper 
originates from tabletop exercise experience, this paper will focus on tabletop 
exercises and pose the question of whether they are an effective form of preparing 
response assets. Tabletop exercises can be as much as 10 times less expensive 
than a full-scale exercise and may be able to address issues and plans with 
stakeholders that have the ability to make appropriate organizational changes.  
Additionally, by solely focusing on tabletops, the successes and limitations of these 
exercises can be thoroughly examined and evaluated for their effectiveness. 
 
108 ibid 
109 FEMA.  Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program.  
https://hseep.dhs.gov/pages/1001_About.aspx (Date accessed 5/1/2013) 
110 Ibid 
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The Importance of Conducting Exercises 
Significant events over the past four decades have put pressure on the United 
States government to exercise response and preparedness. Attacks both 
domestically and internationally have pushed legislation into domestic resilience, 
combating terrorism, incident command, and disaster preparedness. In the 1980’s, 
the U.S. saw a rise of state-sponsored terrorism that included the following:  
1. In 1983, the United States embassy in Beirut, Lebanon was bombed, killing 
63 people, mostly embassy and CIA staff members, as well as several 
soldiers and one Marine. 17 of the dead were Americans.111  
2. In 1984, the Achille Lauro cruise ship was seized by a terrorist group known 
by the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), holding 700 hostages, mostly 
Americans; 1 death.112 
3. In 1985, TWA 847 flight hijacked; 1 death when a U.S Navy Diver was killed 
and tossed on to the Tarmac in Beirut, Lebanon.113  
4. In December 1988, Pan Am 103 was bombed and exploded over Lockerbie, 
UK, killing all 270 people on board residing from 21 different countries.114 
In 1985 Vice President George Bush created “Vice President’s Task Force on 
Combating Terrorism” as the first end-to-end review focused on joint/interagency 
Counter Terrorism response assets coordination. This review resulted in the passing 
 
111 Silent Thunder Terrorism Brief 
112 The Vice President's Task Force on Combating Terrorism Report.  The White House.  July 20, 1985.  
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB55/nsdd179.pdf (Date accessed 05/01/2013) 
113 ibid 
114 Terrorist Bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.  Central Intelligence Agency. July 23, 2012. 
https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/cia-museum/experience-the-collection/text-version/stories/terrorist-
bombing-of-pan-am-flight-103.html (Date accessed 05/05/2012) 
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of National Security Decision Directive 207 on Jan 20, 1986, where the U.S. National 
terrorism program first defined:  “U.S. Program on Combating Terrorism” crisis 
response to incidents overseas, ultimately guiding U.S. strategy for the next 
decade.115 Terrorism and other disasters continued to be the catalyst to push 
legislation and directives over the next 25 years, including the passing of several 
presidential policy directives discussed in the first two chapters that identified the 
need for better response and preparedness by first responders and follow-on 
response during a crisis. Some of the legislation and policy directives specifically site 
the need for conducting tabletop exercises to help prepare for similar disasters. 
Terrorism 
In 1996, in response to the Tokyo sarin gas attacks and the Oklahoma City 
bombing, we again discuss President Bill Clinton’s issuing of Presidential Decision 
Directive (PDD) 39 due to relevance. Essentially, it stated it is the policy of the 
United States to “deter, defeat and respond vigorously to all terrorist attacks on our 
territory and against our citizens, or facilities, whether they occur domestically, in 
international waters or airspace or on foreign territory... the U.S. shall pursue 
vigorously efforts to deter and preempt, apprehend and prosecute, or assist other 
governments to prosecute, individuals who perpetrate or plan to perpetrate such 
attacks.”116 
 
 115 NSDD 207, The National Program for Combating Terrorism. 1986. The White House. 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-207.pdf. (Date accessed 05/02/2013) 
116 PPD-39.  U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism. June 21, 1995. http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm (Date 
accessed 02/25/2013) 
 83 
Around that same time, many Congressional committees and subcommittees 
met on topics such as National Security and Combating Terrorism. One of the 
programs discussed that demonstrated the expanded role of the government in 
domestic preparedness is the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Preparedness Program. This 
program rose from the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 
signed by President Clinton.117 This program looked to provide training for possible 
incidents involving terrorists using Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).118  From 
this, the Department of Defense and Federal agencies were provided millions of 
dollars to conduct training, including tabletop exercises, in 140 cities across the 
U.S.119 
Disasters and National Level Exercises 
In 2005, Hurricane Katrina was considered the most destructive and costly 
hurricane to hit the United States, with damage estimated at $125 billion and 1,500 
deaths across four states.120 Part of the blame is claimed to be from poor 
communication and response to this disaster, as the Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs cited the failure of government at all levels to 
plan, prepare for, and respond aggressively to the storm.121  Specifically, they stated 
that four overarching factors contributed to the failures. These are: 
 
117 Findings of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici.  September 23, 1995. 
www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/.../MR1251.AppE.pdf (Date accessed 02/28/2013) 
118 Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program.  October 2, 1998. 
http://www.gao.gov/products/T-NSIAD-99-16 (Date accessed 02/28/2013) 
119 Ibid 
120 Hurricane Katrina. February 12, 2007. http://www.katrina.noaa.gov/ (Date accessed 02/26/2013) 
121 Special Report of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Hurricane Katrina: A 
Nation Still Unprepared. 2006. www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-109srpt322/.../CRPT-109srpt322.pdf (Date 
accessed 03/01/2013) 
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1. Long-term warnings went unheeded, and government officials neglected 
their duties to prepare for a forewarned catastrophe; 
2. Government officials took insufficient actions or made poor decisions in the 
days immediately before and after landfall; 
3. Systems on which officials relied on to support their response efforts failed; 
and 
4. Government officials at all levels failed to provide effective leadership.122 
The report stated that preparation plans and response were inefficient and not 
well devised. Additionally, the report stated that the government had been 
insufficiently conducting training and exercises. In 2005, DHS assumed full 
responsibility for planning, conducting, and after-action reporting of the National 
Exercise Program, known then as the Top Officials exercises or TOPOFF 
exercises.123  In April 2005, DHS had implemented TOPOFF3 or the third tabletop 
exercise in the series which was designed to identify vulnerabilities in the Nation’s 
domestic incident management capability including the structure of the NRP.124  The 
NRP originated from Homeland Security Presidential Directive – 5 and was directed 
by President Bush to align Federal coordination structures, capabilities, and 
resources into a unified, all-discipline, and all-hazards approach to domestic incident 
management which was discussed in our last chapter.125 
Exercises needed if done effectively 
 
122 Ibid 
123 DHS Efforts To Address Lessons Learned in the Aftermath of Top Officials Exercises.  Department of 
Homeland Security.  January 2009.  http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_09-53_Apr09.pdf.  (Date 
accessed 05/02/2013) 
124 Special Report of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Hurricane Katrina: A 
Nation Still Unprepared. 
125 DHS. National Response Plan. December 2004.  
http://www.it.ojp.gov/fusioncenterguidelines/NRPbaseplan.pdf (Date accessed 12/27/2013) 
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In response to the exercise, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
Inspector General stated in November 2005: “the exercise highlighted – at all levels 
of government – a fundamental lack of understanding for the principles and 
protocols set forth in the NRP and the NIMS.”126  This identified confusion provoked 
discussion and demonstrated the importance of conducting exercises. The absence 
of exercises in the NRP meant that there were no further formal opportunities to 
understand potential problems and to incorporate lessons learned into the NRP.127 
From these gaps, DHS through FEMA, dropped the NRP in exchange for the 
National Response Framework (NRF).128  
The NRP was cited as being “insufficiently national in its focus… and 
…should speak more clearly to the roles and responsibilities of all parties involved in 
response.”129 This NRF is further covered in the previous chapter and was expanded 
on with the signing of PPD 8 by President Obama, which in essence, integrated the 
National Preparedness Goal and focused on an integrated, all-of-Nation, 
capabilities-based approach to all-hazard preparedness which can include, but are 
not limited to, the use of tabletop exercises as a form of preparation.130  
One thing Katrina did was reveal the impact that a lack of an effectively 
trained and exercised plan, as well as not practicing the interoperability of 
 
126 Special Report Of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Hurricane Katrina: A 
Nation Still Unprepared 
127 Ibid  
128 DHS.  National Response Framework.  January 2008.  http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-
core.pdf 
129 DHS.  National Response Framework.  January 2008.  http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-
core.pdf 
130 PPD 8.  National Preparedness.  March 2013.  http://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-national-
preparedness (Date access 03/01/2013) 
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communications will further undermine the response.131 As part of the Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, several recommendations were made 
to improve response, coordination and preparedness. Of those, the committee 
recommended that “Federal departments and agencies should be required to 
conduct exercises to ensure that their plans are continually revised and updated,” as 
well as “emergency agencies at the federal, state, and local levels of government, as 
well as first-responder groups outside of government, should receive regular training 
on NRP and NIMS.”132 It is important to note that the NRP is considered the 
foundation of the NRF and it built upon, not entirely rebuilt, the national framework 
previously established.   
Despite these problems, not all was a loss when, in 2005, DHS developed the 
Universal Task List (UTL) and Target Capabilities List (TCL). The UTL helps 
exercise participants and planners by describing incident management tasks to be 
performed and provide them with a standardized reference for all levels of 
government and the private sector. The TCL contains capabilities that various levels 
of government need to develop and maintain to prevent, respond to, and recover 
from a terrorist attack or major disaster.133  These two lists have proven useful to this 
day in all types and levels of exercise. 
Exercise Progress 
 
131 Special Report Of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Hurricane Katrina: A 
Nation Still Unprepared 
132 ibid 
133 DHS Efforts To Address Lessons Learned in the Aftermath of Top Officials Exercises.  Department of 
Homeland Security. 
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Through the lessons learned in the 1990s and the first decade of this century, 
exercises have been identified as a valuable tool for preparedness. These lessons 
have shown the importance of addressing command and control during a crisis 
situation and working through scenarios such as a nuclear or radiological incident or 
a major storm. This progress has not always been so positive. The final after-action 
report recommendations from the TOPOFF3 exercise failed to include improvement 
planning to address remedial needs and corrective action procedures which were 
not a part of the original evaluation. It only informed participating departments and 
agencies of existing problems, and encouraged improvements in agency prevention, 
response, and recovery capabilities. Furthermore, after-action reports, best 
practices, and lessons learned from the TOPOFF3 exercise have not been 
disseminated to a broad national audience.134   
Despite some of the problems stated, there is still great need for response 
agencies’ personnel to exercise their plans and prepare for disasters. For the 
response assets to take part in these exercises, it comes at the cost of government 
spending. When Sequestration is taking effect or budgetary uncertainty lingers, 
training value needs to be maximized for ultimate effectiveness.135  One cost-
effective solution to providing an exercise that helps identify gaps or vulnerabilities in 
plans and preparedness are tabletop exercises. Tabletop exercises have evolved to 
incorporate the most important objectives and have been proven to be effective at 
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training personnel without a large cost or resource commitment.136  The difference in 
costs between a field exercise that requires the deployment of assets and a tabletop 
exercises can be as much as ten times.137 Despite this, field exercises are still 
necessary to ensure front line response and command post officials are able to 
handle their tasks and responsibilities in a stress added situation.138 So, can tabletop 
exercises provide an effective training and exercising of plans and procedures 
needed for response assets to prepare for a disaster?  Furthermore, how do we 
know this to be true from a discussion-based exercise? 
Evaluating Tabletop Exercise Effectiveness 
Despite the number of years tabletop exercises have been utilized for 
preparedness, only unreliable formal evaluation systems had existed until the 
creation of the DHS’s/FEMA Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 
(HSEEP) in 2005.139 This has been problematic and is characterized in a statement 
by Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General in an Executive 
Summary regarding DHS Efforts to Address Lessons Learned written in the 
Aftermath of Top Officials Exercises:140 
“Since the first Top Officials exercises in 2000, neither a process for 
tracking weaknesses and how those weaknesses were resolved, nor a 
method for identifying and analyzing trends in corrective actions or 
significant lessons learned has been established. As a result, federal, 
state, local, and territorial agencies were unclear regarding the 
 
136 FEMA.  Exercise Design. 
137 Joe Schwartzel interview 
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139 FEMA.  Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program.  April 2012.  
https://hseep.dhs.gov/pages/1001_About.aspx (Date accessed 03/01/2013) 
140DHS. DHS Efforts to Address Lessons Learned in the Aftermath of Top Officials Exercises  
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implementation of suggested improvements following preparedness 
exercises.”    
FEMA developed a standardized program that includes common terminology 
for exercise design, development, conduct, evaluation, and improvement 
planning.141  
          One of the benefits from this program is support organizations can achieve 
objective assessments of their capabilities. Strengths and areas for improvement are 
identified, corrected, and shared appropriately prior to a real incident.142  This can be 
a strength of the program but must still be monitored and utilized effectively. DHS 
Office of Inspector again cited problems with the program in a review titled “FEMA’s 
Management of Corrective Actions and Lessons Learned from National Level 
Exercises”, stating: 
“FEMA did not consistently track and manage corrective actions assigned 
to it resulting from exercises carried out in 2007 and 2009, nor did it 
finalize and implement guidance for doing so. Furthermore, fewer than 40 
percent of corrective actions resulting from these exercises, many of 
which FEMA was responsible for completing, were completed. FEMA also 
did not adequately validate corrective actions to improve planning and 
disaster response. Finally, FEMA did not sufficiently disseminate 
information on agency specific lessons learned. As a result, FEMA 
missed opportunities to validate its actions in future exercises and actual 
events, learn from and apply the experiences of its personnel, and 
improve its incident management operations.”143 
 
What’s the alternative? 
 
141 FEMA. HSEEP 
142 Ibid 
143 FEMA’s Management of Corrective Actions and Lessons Learned From National Level Exercises.  DHS.  
September 2012.  http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIG_12-118_Sep12.pdf.  (Date accessed 
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  No program will offer a perfect solution and all programs will necessitate the 
organizations involved to follow through with improvement planning. Some of the 
issues that surround evaluated exercises can be the willingness of players to admit 
gaps or identify exercise objectives that might show weakness. One potential 
solution is no-fault, non-attribution exercises. These exercises are not considered an 
HSEEP exercise, but can include exercise participants to self-evaluate exercise play 
during hotwashes (post exercise discussions), after-action reviews, and 
improvement planning meetings.   
 One example of these no fault TTXs come from the Isotope Crossroad 
exercise series cosponsored by NNSA and the FBI. In an exercise Isotope 
Crossroads: Montana conducted on March 3, 2020, conducted in Helena, Montana, 
with the primary objective to bring federal, state and local agencies together to walk 
through and exercise a security incident involving the transportation of radioactive 
material across Montana. 77 participants from a total of 40 federal, state, and local 
agencies in areas of law enforcement, disaster and emergency services, local and 
state governments, military, health physics, and firefighting. Some of the discussion 
in the exercise included Interagency intelligence/information sharing surrounding a 
radiological incident as well as response plans. Lessons learned gathered from a 
post exercise discussion provided qualitative data along with surveys and polling 
providing quantifiable information.144 
This important data can be gathered for areas of improvement to produce 
metrics in qualitative and quantitative forms with the use of questionnaires, polling, 
 
144 “Isotope Crossroads: Montana” March 03, 2020 
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narratives, logs, checklists, or surveys.145 A lot of progress has been made over the 
last two decades to improve these techniques and forms, and significant data has 
been gathered from these methods. But do these techniques and forms answer the 
question on whether the exercise was effective?  Do they help identify any expected 
results from exercise objectives? Unexpected results? This analysis will be looked at 
further in the evidence section. 
Some of the goals for a tabletop exercises could be to evaluate policies, 
plans, and procedures,146 it is vital that metrics are collected. Polling, questionnaires 
or surveys are able to gather response from participants or players, but do they 
provide the end user any meaningful data that determines if the exercise was 
effective?    
Common Evaluation 
Common to all tabletop exercises is the debriefing portion of the event, 
commonly called “the hotwash”. A hotwash is an opportunity for participants to 
provide their inputs on how well the exercise went, what plans or procedures should 
be changed, lessons learned, and make commitments on changes they see are 
appropriate.147  It is common for an exercise to be followed by an evaluation meeting 
and may include an after-action report stating findings of the evaluation team and 
the effectiveness of the exercise. It serves as the basis for planning future exercises, 
upgrading contingency plans, and taking corrective actions.148 
 
145 FEMA. Exercise Design. 
146 Brown, Monica. Use of tabletop exercises for disaster preparedness Training.  August 2010.  
http://digitalcommons.library.tmc.edu/dissertations/AAI1475678/ (Date accessed 03/01/2013) 
147 FEMA, Exercise Design, Unit 8 
148 Ibid 
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One of the greatest qualitative metrics gained during the debriefing or 
hotwash are the lessons learned. But these lessons learned could be irrelevant such 
as the lessons learned from the “Hurricane Pam” exercise conducted in 2005 prior to 
Hurricane Katrina, if they have not been properly implemented and 
communicated.149 From the failures in information gathering and sharing, progress 
has been made in evaluating exercise effectiveness with the implementation of 
HSEEP.  
Next Steps Toward Identifying Effectiveness 
Substantial progress has been made in evaluating tabletop exercises, but 
more could be done. For one, it would be beneficial to gather more than just 
qualitative data. Quantitative data can be extremely beneficial for both private and 
public organizations. This data could be used to forecast improvement in response 
times and effort, identifying resource needs and training when gaps are identified, as 
well as aligning training budget concerns. 
Secondly, the HSEEP program only applies to DHS-funded exercises and is 
not necessarily utilized for no-fault or exercises conducted outside of government 
mandated HSEEP exercises. Furthermore, HSEEP may not always be the solution.  
Exercises that are mandated to be evaluated such as HSEEP, have seen their share 
of problems which are highlighted in the Congressional Research Service Report for 
Congress titled “Homeland Emergency Preparedness and the National Exercise 
 
149 Mitigation Journal.  Effective Tabletop Exercises.  November 2010 
http://www.mitigationjournal.org/2010/11/effective-tabletop-exercises.html (Date accessed 03/01/2013) 
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Program: Background, Policy Implications, and issues for Congress”.  Noted in the 
report was the following: 
The identification of capabilities on which to build through a public AAR, as 
required by the HSEEP method, may raise challenges if exercise 
participants have not adequately exercised their plans, or are concerned 
about potential consequences as a result of negative evaluations.  As a 
result, there may be incentives for some exercise planners to understate 
exercise objectives, overstate the extent to which those objectives are met, 
or to downplay or omit deficiencies that are identified.  Any of those 
approaches arguably undermines the effectiveness of the exercise as tools 
to prepare for an incident, or to evaluate an entity’s capacity to respond to 
an incident. 
 
This report does point out the possibility of a potential bias or incentive for planners 
and participants to not fully identify problems when an exercise is evaluated. This 
indication of bias may provide explanation for the need of including no-fault 
exercises which essentially allows all participants and players to work through the 
exercise in an open environment without penalty. The report further indicated: 
The HSEEP method does not provide common benchmarks or metrics to 
apply in the evaluation of an exercise.  Moreover, under the HSEEP 
method, exercises are typically evaluated by the same group that designs 
the exercise.  This approach, which extends beyond the National 
Evaluation Program to any entity that uses the HSEEP method, may be 
problematic if the evaluators fail to critically asses their own program. 
[HSEEP has made some changes and improvements since the writing of 
this chapter.  A new version published in January 2020 has improved 
some of the areas cited]   
 
So, is no evaluation the solution?  One reasonable answer appears to be 
allowing for self-assessments to be conducted similar to what is done in no-fault 
tabletop exercises, but can these types of evaluations be done effectively?   To 
determine if this is effective, it is necessary to analyze the current forms of 
evaluation for no-fault tabletop exercises. 
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Analysis 
To assess the current forms of evaluating the effectiveness of no-fault 
exercises and offer alternatives, several individuals with a great deal of experience 
participating in and planning tabletop exercises were interviewed. This cadre 
includes former senior representatives with the Department of State, a Senior Policy 
Advisor to the White House and Department of Energy, a Deputy Under Secretary of 
the National Nuclear Security Administration, an Exercise Director with the Federal 
Bureau of Investigations, a former Navy SEAL, an Assistant Administrator for 
Protective Services and Security with the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, a hospital Emergency Manager, and a Senior Exercise Planner. 
These interviews yielded a broad and detailed view on how tabletop exercises are 
currently evaluated and how they could improve. Moreover, over 100 articles, 
governmental committee and subcommittee notes/reports, journals, after-action 
reports, and thesis were reviewed to gain a strong knowledge of how tabletop 
exercises are evaluated and whether they are effective. 
Are qualitative assessments good enough? 
Although no numeric rating may result from qualitative assessments and 
responses, one can certainly provide solid qualitative evidence that an exercise was 
effective through subjective post exercise evaluations/critiques provided by exercise 
participants. Though it can be subjective, the individuals interviewed also provided 
examples of how one can determine that an exercise was effective solely through 
qualitative response. Common qualitative examples discussed in the interviews as 
well as actual results from tabletop experience include: 
 95 
• Teambuilding and familiarity among response assets and leadership – The 
tabletop exercise provides an opportunity for first responders and follow-on 
response to meet one another, sometimes for the first time, and get to 
know/build trust among one another. “Almost impossible to measure, but a 
tabletop exercise is invaluable because it is the relationships built between 
responders in an emergency.  [A tabletop exercise] builds a trust between 
response.”150 
 
• Knowledge gained of roles, responsibilities, and assets among responding 
parties – Deputy Under Secretary for the National Nuclear Security 
Administration Dr. Steve Aoki stated that taking part in tabletop exercises 
helped him in response guidance to Fukushima.  The exercises he 
participated in provided him with the knowledge on the various response 
assets available and what assets could be called upon during a 
crisis/disaster.  Additionally, the tabletop provided him with a venue to work 
through various scenarios.  Furthermore, the Assistant Administrator at 
NASA, Mr. Mahaley, stated that he took part in a tabletop exercise that 
involved him contacting the White House during a disaster.  This experience 
prepared him for an actual call that was needed while he was acting Director 
of Security for Energy during the blackout of 2003 that impacted much of the 
Northeast United States.  He stated that experience provided him the 
opportunity to work through how a phone call to the White House would take 
place and understand who needed to be included in the call.    
 
• Post-exercise lessons learned - things learned that were otherwise not know 
prior to the exercise.  “For the after action review to be effective, the 
opportunity to incorporate recommended changes to site response plans and 
procedures should be a goal.”151A gap in a current security plan or procedure 
or a lack of understanding of a particular substance/organism often is 
identified through the course of tabletop exercise.  This often results in a 
change in a plan/procedure or a group of people being more comfortable with 
response. 
 
• Knowledge of a particular threat – i.e. group, source/material, attack.  As 
stated from the conclusion of Maryland’s pandemic influenza preparedness 
exercise - It [the tabletop exercise] served to engage the emergency 
response community and address the issues of incident command and how 
pandemic planning fits with the “all hazards” approach.  The exercise also 
educated key partners and stakeholders, through an experiential approach, 
about the potential severe consequences of pandemic influenza, and it 
provided a forum to “drill down” beyond the current state plan and identify 
additional critical local planning activities that are needed.  Instructive insights 
 
150 Mahaley, Joe. Personal Interview. May 10, 2013 
151 Daly, Patrick.  How to plan and conduct a table top exercise.  02/14/2013 
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and lessons were gained from the exercise that should bolster further 
planning efforts in Maryland, not only for pandemic influenza, but also for 
bioterrorism and other public health disasters.152 
 
• Exercising plans in place – a tabletop exercise provides a venue for response 
to actually practice the plans and procedures in place to ensure they fully 
understand said plan/procedure and/or response to a disaster. Mr. Mahaley 
stated “You do what you are trained to do.  In real life, you are going to react 
how you are trained.  In my 40 years of experience, tabletop exercises 
provide the most effective form of training.”153 
This qualitative information is extremely vital and shows a tabletop exercise is 
effective, but this information is not always easy to gather. In almost every interview 
that was conducted, a common theme regarding the best way of obtaining great 
qualitative response was if the exercised remained no-fault or non-attributional, 
allowing an open, honest environment. The reasons stated included that assets are 
more likely to admit faults, vulnerabilities, or lack of understanding or a shortfall in a 
plan/procedure if they are not worried about their job.154 This makes sense 
considering that participants may feel more comfortable speaking if they are not 
being graded. So, if a no-fault tabletop exercise yields the best qualitative 
responses, can it also provide quantitative results to determine effectiveness? 
Quantitative assessments 
Raw, not well developed, quantitative assessments currently exist in the 
tabletop community, but they are not well known and there is no standard. It would 
be useful to have standardized quantitative assessments to assist public and private 
 
152 Taylor, Jean Lin, Brenda J Roup, David Blythe, Greg K. Reed, Tiffany A. Tate, and Kristine A. Moore. 
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness in Maryland: Improving Readiness through a Tabletop Exercise.  Maryland 
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene.  Biosecurity and Bioterrorism. Volume 3, Number 1. 2005 
153 Mahaley, Joe.  Interview. 
154 Daly, Pat.  Interview 
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organizations determine if the money being spent by their organization is going to 
good use and the tabletop exercise is worth attending. With a lack of available 
quantitative metrics, it is prudent to look at ways to quantify the results of a tabletop 
exercise to compliment the qualitative data. Furthermore, for the purpose of this 
chapter, it was stated that exercises may be more effective being non-attributional, 
so we will also mull over this as the type of tabletop exercise being considered. 
Suggested metrics 
Three forms of quantitative assessments should be considered to assist 
government agencies and private organizations with determining effectiveness for a 
no-fault tabletop exercise. These include a pre- and post-test combination to help 
identify the percentage of improvement, a numeric count of observations during and 
post exercise, electronic polling of participants, and a rubric as an assessment tool. 
Conducting a pre- and post- tests among players and observers (observers 
typically consist of other invited responders not sitting at the player’s table) is a way 
to gauge a level of improvement in understanding, knowledge, and collaboration. 
Participants would take a test or survey to indicate their understanding of response 
to a disaster, level of knowledge on the particular threat, and how well they know 
who would be responding/in charge of a particular incident. Then following the 
tabletop exercise, the participants would take the same test and the results would be 
compared between the two. From that, a level of improvement could be gathered 
from the delta providing some quantitative gauge of exercise effectiveness. 
Another potential way to gather quantitative data from a tabletop exercise can 
be in the form of counting the number of observations either during an exercise or 
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post exercise. During a no-fault exercise, an unbiased observer could be included 
not to grade or place fault, but to instead count the number of observations that a 
participant learned something, a vulnerability was identified, a gap in a plan or 
procedure was identified, or an agency stated they were unaware of a particular 
response or response asset. The observations could then be sorted and tallied. This 
could also be done post- exercise counting the number of changes made to plans, 
policies, or procedures, as well as anything else that may have resulted from the 
exercise experience. 
Electronic polling of participants can be an effective way to gather specific 
data throughout an exercise. A variety of companies produce polling technology 
such as online formats in which the participant uses a smart phone and other 
formats in which the exercise facilitator provides the participants with polling 
equipment to log their selections. This information can be provided to the planners, 
government, and participants in real-time and provide a significant benefit to 
improvement planning. 
The final suggestion that should be considered is an original contribution from 
the research for this chapter. This rubric was designed considering the great number 
of tasks and objectives that may be included in a tabletop exercise. Table 3 is shown 
in its full capacity in Appendix 1.   
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Table 3: Exercise Effectiveness 
Scoring Effectiveness, Using the Rubric 
To utilize the rubric, exercise evaluators would develop the rubric based on 
objectives and tasks identified for the exercise. These objectives and tasks would be 
listed on the left and employ the descriptions listed beside the tasks to determine a 
score for the specific task or question listed. Each task would receive a 1 (lowest 
quality), 2 (average quality) or a 3 (highest quality) based on how well the tabletop 
exercise fulfilled the task. The culmination of the tasks/questions listed in the rubric 
should fulfill the purpose and goals of the exercise. Hence, a score toward the higher 
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end of the max scoring should indicate exercise effectiveness. In the example in 
Appendix 1, the minimum score would be a 20 with a maximum value of 60. 
Considering the range, a median score of at least 30 may indicate an effective 
exercise, but it would be up to the designer of the rubric to identify the threshold 
based on the number of tasks/questions listed and their respective values. One 
other suggestion to the rubric might be assigning a greater weighted value range for 
tasks/questions that have great importance.  
Who should complete the rubric? 
In this assessment, it would make sense to utilize two groups to fill out this 
form following the exercise. In the first group, the players should be considered the 
primary responder to the rubric. They will be the main focus and it will be their 
response to the exercise scenario that will be gauged. The rubric could remain 
anonymous since the exercise in no-fault and will not be a factor in gauging the 
results. Additionally, the tabletop exercise remaining no-fault may foster more honest 
response from the players. The second group that would complete the rubric 
consists of site agents that have expert knowledge and experience with tabletop 
exercises. They may be individuals that assist in the setup and reality design of the 
exercise but are not a part of the exercise planning/facilitation team and have no 
stake in how well the exercise performs. Ideally this would be someone who can 
observe the exercise, but one who is not a player or providing response during the 
exercise. Lastly, a combination of the two may be the best model. By obtaining a 
score from both the players and the site, one could compare the averages between 
the two sets to see any deviation of appeared effectiveness. 
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Considering the potential alternatives to the current quantitative metrics 
available, the rubric may provide the most value to gain a quantitative insight from a 
no-fault exercise.    
Conclusion 
Throughout the process that included interviews with leading exercise experts 
and a vast amount of research, this chapter was meant to demonstrate that the 
methods currently used to evaluate some exercises are insufficient and propose an 
alternative suite of methods. Ultimately, the question became not if tabletop 
exercises are effective, but instead how can one gauge the level of effectiveness 
from a tabletop exercise. If exercise planners have the right tools and are prepared 
to gauge response, exercise effectiveness should be transparent to the 
organizations they are preparing.   
Another take away in the researching of tabletop exercise effectiveness is 
that determining effectiveness can be done from qualitative metrics if exercise 
objectives are clear and the exercise produces lessons learned. Whether it is an 
emergency manager saying they gained an understanding of the appropriate fire, 
law enforcement, or medical staff that would be responding to their facility in an 
actual emergency or it is a police chief that is able to see that their current standard 
operating procedures will not suffice in a particular disaster, qualitative response can 
provide great data to determine effectiveness. As these metrics are continually 
refined, a combination of qualitative and quantitative data may be the most useful to 
organizations in having an understanding of the level of effectiveness from a 
tabletop exercise.  
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Since the suggestions offered to improve quantitative metrics available have 
little testing, it would be beneficial for organizations to experiment with the 
suggestions to gauge their use. Additionally, more research and experimenting could 
be done to identify additional ways of gaining quantitative metrics from a tabletop 
exercise. Overall, the goal of this chapter is to illustrate a substantial benefit that 
could be provided by quantifying the effectiveness of an exercise. This could offer 
substantial evidence with regards to tying the purpose of the exercise provided by 
senior leadership and the outcomes. 
In future research and development in this area, the level of effectiveness 
should be examined in monetary terms. One area that would bring great interest 
from both public and private organizations alike would be to develop a return on 
investment formula to help private organizations with training budgets and 






 Over the course of this paper being developed, the realization was made of 
how undeveloped the U.S. was in terms of infrastructure, response, planning, and 
exercises to nuclear and radiological preparedness prior to the turn of the century. 
Essentially. it is presented in Chapter 1 that the U.S. federal agencies didn’t start 
taking over responsibility and building out infrastructure to prepare for and respond 
to nuclear and radiological incidents until the start of the 1970s. Comparative to 
natural disasters like storms, this is an extremely new field of work. Historical context 
provided that the field didn’t start in the 1940s and the preparedness to nuclear and 
radiological incidents was passed over to Federal agencies from the Department of 
Defense until the 1970s.  
 The reactive nature of the U.S. government, and the world for that 
matter, to nuclear and radiological preparedness is illustrated throughout the chapter 
by significant incidents like Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Goiania. Each incident 
identified different aspects of learning from experience for the U.S. in both response 
as well as what capabilities are necessary to address the incidents. This is not to 
point fault, but to illustrate how new the field was. As soon as the U.S. started to get 
a grasp on the preparedness aspect of nuclear and radiological events with regards 
to an accident, during the last part of the century showed a rise of intentional attacks 
and terrorism. This brought the possibility of a new threat to the U.S. not formerly 
addressed throughout all levels of government in preparing for the intentional use of 
these materials in an attack. U.S. began to address this in three ways. They makeup 
of the federal response and licensing agencies involving nuclear and radiological 
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material evolved and were formed. Agencies such as DOE, NRC, FEMA and others 
were all formed to protect and respond to incidents involving nuclear and radiological 
material.   
Secondly, various administrations addressed response to potential threats 
involving these materials by a variety of means to include Reagan’s administration 
forming the VP task force to combat terrorism and the Clinton Administration issuing 
Presidential Decision Directives such as the PDD 39. Lastly, specialized units were 
created throughout this 30-year period to include FRMAC and NEST that provided a 
niche form of disaster response to a relatively new threat. The chapter ended with 
the U.S. forming NNSA which continues to be a critical organization with its mission 
of: 
Maintaining the Stockpile  
NNSA ensures the United States maintains a safe, secure, and reliable 
nuclear stockpile through the application of unparalleled science, technology, 
engineering, and manufacturing.  
Nonproliferation 
NNSA works to prevent nuclear weapon proliferation and reduce the threat of 
nuclear and radiological terrorism around the world. The agency endeavors to 
prevent the development of nuclear weapons and the spread of materials 
or knowledge needed to create them. 
Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation 
NNSA plays a key role in preventing, countering, and responding to a terrorist 
or other adversary with a nuclear or radiological device. 
Powering the Nuclear Navy 
NNSA provides militarily effective nuclear propulsion plants and ensures their 
safe, reliable and long-lived operation.155 
 
 The second chapter focused solely on radioactive materials due to the 
common availability of them across the U.S. and the slower adoption of security, 




nuclear material. This chapter illustrated the evolution of the U.S. by the creation of 
new agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security, new organizations 
with agencies such as FBI’s WMD Directorate; new presidential directives such as 
HSPD-5, HSPD-8, PPD-8; frameworks such as the National Prevention, Protection, 
Response, Mitigation, and Recovery Frameworks and systems such as the NIMS 
and ICS; and agency-specific and Interagency response protocols to better support 
the security of the material and the response to a potential radiological incident.  
 To simplify the context of the U.S. radiological security infrastructure as 
clearly as possible, one could look at it similar to a product lifecycle. Essentially, the 
beginning of the decade could represent the introduction phase to threats and the 
U.S. early adoption of practices and infrastructure development. The mid-2000s 
between 2008 and 2012 being a point of rapid growth with significant resources and 
government spending being focused on radiological security, to where we are today 
in a maturity stage. Over the last two decades, the U.S. has significantly addressed 
the radiological security threat to the point of having the some of the top experts in 
the world on preparedness and response.  
 The last chapter of the paper was provided to illustrate a mechanism to test 
where preparedness is or needs to be. Over the last 50 years, the U.S. has 
developed and evolved its response to nuclear and radiological incidents. TTXs are 
used to test the maturity of plans and response. The discussion on tabletop 
exercises evolved from an introduction to suggesting how these exercises could be 
improved to better understand if they are actually effective upon completion. This 
concept is a significant concern for agencies as they validate funding and 
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government spending. As a result of the research, a rubric was developed to help tie 
evaluation metrics to exercise objectives to provide a direct numeric assessment on 
the success of an exercise. This work on developing the rubric and expanding 
exercise effectiveness is a passion of my company and should be expanded to 
federal agencies over the next year. 
 As a result of this paper, it is easy to use hindsight to pinpoint flaws in 
preparedness. As Mr. Glick summarized this best, “Hindsight is better than 20/20.”  
I’ve had the privilege to interview and work with the top officials, planners, and 
response agencies in the field of nuclear and radiological preparedness. It is evident 
that U.S. agencies are staffed with the best experts in the fields and are on the 
cutting edge of advancing the country’s preparedness to threats. One can look back 
at how the U.S. prepared, planned, exercised, or responded to events from a view 
that stands in time and provides no context to time still moving forward. This paper 
looks to illustrate that significant changes have been made to improve infrastructure, 
planning and exercises from lessons learned through the use of historic data, first-
hand interviews, and charts to align my argument. It also illustrates that the U.S. has 
shifted our mindset to one of proactive by evidence throughout infrastructure, 
planning, and response. With regards to radiological security, this is apparent by 
ORS’s model currently working worldwide to remove or reduce high-activity 
radioactive material from facilities could pose a threat to a population if not properly 
secured. This is also apparent by the changes in U.S. agencies, plans, and how 
exercises are conducted to include revisions made to the HSEEP guidance and 
exercise delivery. 
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 Preparedness to nuclear and radiological incidents is constantly evolving. 
Threats to/from, bad actors, tools used, and impacts change constantly. In order to 
reduce the risk of great consequence to U.S., the country will have to continue to 
maintain a proactive approach, enhance interagency coordination and 
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